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DEATH IS NOT SO DIFFERENT AFTER ALL: GRAHAM V.
FLORIDA AND THE COURT’S “KIDS ARE DIFFERENT”
EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Mary Berkheiser*†
INTRODUCTION
In Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court declared that
life sentences without the possibility of parole for non-homicides are offlimits for all juveniles.1 Following its lead from Roper v. Simmons, the
landmark decision that abolished the juvenile death penalty,2 the Graham
Court expanded upon its Eighth Amendment juvenile jurisprudence by
ruling that locking up juveniles for life based on crimes other than
homicides is cruel and unusual.3 Thus, the Court categorically barred life
sentencing without parole for juveniles who did not kill anyone.4 This
categorical exclusion is a momentous decision that will directly impact the
lives of the 123 juvenile offenders whose sentences for non-homicides have
relegated them to prison with no prospect of freedom.5 Now, they at least
have the hope that their sentences will be reviewed and that they may win
release.
Of even greater import for the thousands of juvenile offenders whose
sentences Graham does not impact directly, however, is the legal reasoning
the Court used in striking down juvenile life without parole for nonhomicides. The Court employed an analytical approach previously reserved
exclusively for death penalty cases, and it did so without fanfare or obvious
heavy lifting.6 Indeed, the Court’s analytical approach unceremoniously
demolished the Hadrian’s Wall that has separated its “death is different”
jurisprudence from non-capital sentencing review since 1972.7 In its place,
the Court fortified an expansive “kids are different” jurisprudence that
traces its roots to Thompson v. Oklahoma 8 and is now firmly planted with
the Court’s rulings in Roper and Graham. And just as Graham crossed the
* Professor of Law, Director of Clinical Programs, and Director of Juvenile Justice Clinic,
William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
† I am grateful for the financial support of the Boyd School of Law, and I want to thank Law
Librarian Matthew Wright, Research Assistant Gail Cline, and ace proofreader and cite-checker Iva
Todorova for their painstaking and good-humored assistance.
1. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
3. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2052.
6. Id. at 2022–23.
7. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972).
8. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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rigid divide between the Court’s death and non-death cases, it placed the
Court’s categorical approach to sentencing, formerly the exclusive province
of the death penalty, within reach of all juveniles serving adult sentences.
This Article describes why this is so and its implications for juvenile
offenders sentenced to adult prison time.
Part I explores the Graham decision, beginning with a summary of the
underlying facts and an analysis of the Court’s ruling. It highlights the
Court’s reasoning and the sources of its conclusion that juvenile life without
parole is a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. Then, Parts II and III demonstrate the immensity of Graham’s
ruling in Eighth Amendment jurisprudential terms by tracing the welltraveled divide between capital and non-capital proportionality analysis
under the Court’s precedents. Following that review, Part IV examines the
criminalization of adolescence brought about by sweeping legislative
changes that have made it easier to try increasing numbers of juveniles as
adults, even while juvenile crime has steadily decreased. Finally, Part V
concludes by making the case for an enlightened proportionality review for
all juvenile offenders serving adult sentences in adult prisons, viewed
through a “kids are different” lens. This lens considers the characteristics of
juveniles found first in Roper, and now in Graham, to be determinative in
resolving juveniles’ Eighth Amendment challenges.9
I. TERRANCE GRAHAM’S PATH TO THE SUPREME COURT AND HIS
WEIGHTY VICTORY
Terrance Graham was sixteen years old when he and three other
teenagers 10 attempted to rob a barbecue restaurant in Jacksonville, Florida.11
Although the would-be robbers were unsuccessful, the prosecutor elected to
try Graham as an adult rather than as a juvenile.12 The prosecutor charged
Graham with armed burglary with assault or battery, which carried a
maximum penalty of life in prison without the possibility of parole,13 and
9. This argument does not endorse the continued wholesale incarceration of our youth in adult
prisons. Rather, it accepts as a present reality that juveniles are being tried and sentenced as adults, and
that many juvenile offenders are now serving sentences in adult prisons. Additionally, it offers a
developmentally informed approach to proportionality review that would alter those sentences. The
larger issues surrounding our nation’s criminalization of adolescence are left for another day.
10. Throughout this article, the terms “teenagers,” “juveniles,” “adolescents,” “children,” and
“youth” are used interchangeably, and without distinction, to refer to those under the age of eighteen.
11. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2018.
12. Under Florida law, prosecutors have the discretion to charge sixteen and seventeen-yearolds as either juveniles or adults for most felonies. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.227(1)(b) (2003)
(subsequently renumbered at § 985.557(1)(b) (2006)).
13. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 810.02(1)(b), (2)(a) (2003)). See infra note 21 (noting abolition of
parole in Florida).
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attempted armed robbery, which carried a maximum sentence of fifteen
years.14 Graham pleaded guilty to both charges, but the trial court withheld
adjudication of guilt and sentenced him to three years probation.15 Within a
year, Graham was re-arrested, this time in connection with a home-invasion
robbery after he fled from police.16 Another year passed before the court
held a hearing on the probation violations relating to the home invasion and
flight.17 Although Graham denied that he participated in the home invasion,
he admitted that he had violated the conditions of his probation by fleeing,
even though that admission alone could trigger a life sentence.18 After
hearing evidence related to the home invasion, the court found that Graham
had violated the terms of his probation by attempting to evade arrest,
committing a home-invasion robbery, possessing a firearm, and associating
with persons engaged in criminal activity.19 At the sentencing hearing, the
judge commented to Graham, “I don’t know why it is that you threw your
life away,”20 before ruling that Graham deserved the stiffest possible
penalty—life in prison without parole21—to “protect the community from
[his] actions.”22
On review, the First District Court of Appeal of Florida found that the
serious and violent nature of the charges and Graham’s age—seventeen at
the time of the crimes and nineteen at sentencing—warranted the extreme
penalty.23 That finding was bolstered by the court’s view that Graham was
incapable of rehabilitation because he had chosen to continue committing
crimes “at an escalating pace.”24 After the Florida Supreme Court denied
review,25 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.26 The Court
overturned the sentence, ruling that “[t]he Constitution prohibits the
imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did
not commit homicide.”27 The Court did not go so far as to erect an outright
prohibition of life imprisonment for juveniles, like its ban on the juvenile
14. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 812.13(2)(b), 777.04(1), (4)(a), 775.082(3)(c) (2003)).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2018–19.
17. Id. at 2019.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2020. The actual sentence was life in prison; however, because Florida had abolished
its parole system, see FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003), the life sentence affords no opportunity for
release absent executive clemency. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2020.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d 43, 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
25. Id. (citing Graham v. State, 990 So. 2d 1058 (Table) (Fla. 2008)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2034.
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death penalty in Roper.28 However, it ruled that states must provide juvenile
offenders serving life sentences for non-homicides “some realistic
opportunity to obtain release before the end of that term.”29 The upshot for
Graham, and for all other juvenile offenders serving life sentences without
parole for non-homicides, is that they may now petition for their release
from prison. No longer will they face death in prison as the only way to live
out their lives.
II. WHAT THE GRAHAM COURT DECIDED AND HOW IT GOT THERE
The Graham Court 30 began its analysis with a review of the Court’s
Eighth Amendment precedents, emphasizing at the outset that “the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”
determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.31 While the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits “inherently barbaric punishments
under all circumstances,” the Court recognized that its precedents generally
do not consider punishments challenged as barbaric, but “as
disproportionate to the crime.”32 “The concept of proportionality,” the Court
said, “is central to the Eighth Amendment. Embodied in the Constitution’s
ban on cruel and unusual punishments is the ‘precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]
offense.’”33
The Court next described its proportionality jurisprudence as falling
within two general classifications.34 The first includes challenges to the
28. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
29. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034. At oral argument, counsel for Graham conceded that even a
sentence as long as forty years before parole consideration would be constitutional. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 6–7, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08-7412), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-7412.pdf. However, the Court
did not adopt that concession or endorse any other specific length of sentence as inside or outside the
reach of the Eighth Amendment. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
30. Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, with Justice Stevens filing a concurring opinion in
which Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Chief Justice Roberts filed a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined in whole by Justice Scalia and in part by
Justice Alito. Id. at 2043 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Alito filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at
2058 (Alito, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 2021 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
32. Id. (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002)).
33. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)). This view is not
universally held by the Supreme Court Justices. Justices Scalia and Thomas take the position that the
Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality principle. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S.
11, 32 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994–95 (1991) (opinion of
Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
34. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.

2011]

Death Is Not So Different After All

5

length of sentences in specific cases based on the totality of the
circumstances.35 The Court acknowledged the difficulty of establishing a
lack of proportionality in those cases, citing only one of its precedents in
which the defendant raised a successful proportionality challenge.36 Since
Harmelin v. Michigan in 1991,37 a slim majority of the Court has
recognized a “narrow proportionality principle[] that . . . forbids only
extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”38 The
two cases the Court has reviewed under the Harmelin standard produced
closely divided decisions, and neither sentence rose to the level of
disproportionality required by Harmelin.39
The Court then proceeded to the second classification of Eighth
Amendment cases, in which categorical rules define the limits of the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause.40 Within this classification are two
subsets: one considering the nature of the offense and another considering
the nature of the offender.41 Under these two categorical approaches, the
Court has ruled that the death penalty is impermissible for non-homicide
crimes.42 It has also categorically barred the death penalty for those who
function in an intellectually low range43 and those who committed their
crimes before age eighteen.44 It is the latter classification that received the
Court’s greatest attention in Graham,45 and for good reason. As noted
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (overturning as disproportionate under the
Eighth Amendment a life without parole sentence for a seventh non-violent felony, the crime of passing
a bad check)). But see Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam) (upholding a sentence of forty
years for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and for distribution of marijuana); Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 281, 284–85 (1980) (upholding a sentence of life with possibility of parole for a
third non-violent felony, obtaining money by false pretenses).
37. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[S]tare decisis counsels our
adherence to the narrow proportionality principle that has existed in our Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence for 80 years.”).
38. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997, 1000–01 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id. at 2021–22 (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003) (plurality opinion)
(upholding a sentence of twenty-five years to life for theft of golf clubs worth in excess of $400 under
California’s three-strikes recidivist statute)); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (upholding a
sentence of fifty years to life for shoplifting videotapes under California’s three-strikes statute).
40. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding that capital punishment for
the rape of a child violated the Eighth Amendment)); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (holding
that capital punishment for a felony murder conviction where defendant did not kill, intend to kill, or
attempt to kill violated the Eighth Amendment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that
capital punishment for the rape of an adult violated the Eighth Amendment)).
43. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)).
44. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)).
45. Id. at 2023.
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above, Terrance Graham was seventeen and still a child in the eyes of the
law when he committed the crimes for which he later received a sentence of
life without parole. Thus, like Christopher Simmons, whose appeal brought
about the abolition of the juvenile death penalty,46 Graham was a juvenile
serving a sentence intended for adults.47
In the United States Supreme Court, Graham challenged the entire
sentencing practice of condemning juvenile offenders to life in prison.48 In
this respect, Graham’s case stood in contrast to all of the Court’s adult noncapital sentencing decisions. In each of those cases, the petitioner sought
review solely of his particular sentence as disproportionate under the Eighth
Amendment.49 Because Graham’s “categorical challenge”50 to his sentence,
if successful, would place that penalty out of constitutional bounds for all
juveniles, it more closely resembled the Court’s death penalty cases 51 than
its individual non-capital proportionality decisions.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Court departed from its adult
proportionality jurisprudence by relying on death penalty cases to reach its
conclusion that juvenile life without parole for non-homicides offends the
Eighth Amendment. The Court’s earlier decisions addressing terms-ofimprisonment challenges on proportionality grounds had explicitly
eschewed reliance on death penalty cases that applied proportionality
principles because “a sentence of death differs in kind from any sentence of
imprisonment, no matter how long.”52 But the Court stated that those cases,
and the approach to proportionality review taken in them, were unsuited to
Graham’s challenge because he was challenging a sentencing practice and
not solely the sentence he had received.53 The proper analysis, the Court
reasoned, was that used in other cases establishing categorical rules.54 The
fact that all of those cases had been challenges to the death penalty was of
no consequence to the Court; it said simply: “The previous cases in this
46. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79.
47. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2025 (“Once in adult court, a juvenile offender may receive the
same sentence as would be given to an adult offender, including a life without parole sentence. But the
fact that transfer and direct charging laws make life without parole possible for some juvenile
nonhomicide offenders does not justify a judgment that many States intended to subject such offenders
to life without parole sentences.”).
48. Id. at 2022–23.
49. See notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
50. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
51. Id. at 2023 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)).
52. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980). But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S 277, 284–
88 (1983) (tracing the history of proportionality rules and concluding that the Eighth Amendment does
not suggest any distinction between types of punishments, but forbids excessiveness in all punishments).
53. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.
54. Id. at 2023.
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classification [categorical rules] involved the death penalty.”55 “[I]n
addressing the question presented, the appropriate analysis is the one used
in cases that involved the categorical approach, specifically Atkins, Roper,
and Kennedy,”56 all of which just happened to be death penalty cases.
Following the lead of those cases, the Court began with an
examination of “objective indicia of national consensus”57 against the
punishment, looking first to the enactments of state legislatures.58 The Court
found that thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and federal law
permitted the imposition of life without parole on juvenile offenders.59 That
number alone—representing three-quarters of the jurisdictions in the
country—would have been sufficient in the past for the Court to reject
Graham’s claim for lack of a national consensus against the punishment.60
Here, however, the Court looked beyond the raw number and found that the
“actual sentencing practices in jurisdictions where the sentence in question
is permitted by statute” was the critical question,61 and that sentencing
juvenile non-homicide offenders to life without parole was “most
infrequent.”62 By the Court’s own count, 123 juvenile offenders were
serving life without parole for non-homicides, with seventy-seven of those
in Florida and the remaining forty-six in ten other states and the federal
system.63 Thus, with the exception of Florida, other states had imposed the
sentence quite rarely, and even though twenty-six additional states, the
District of Columbia, and federal law authorized the sentence, none of those
jurisdictions had sentenced a juvenile offender to life without parole for a
non-homicide.64

55. Id. at 2022.
56. Id. at 2023; see also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 447 (prohibiting the death penalty for rape of a
child); Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (prohibiting the death penalty for defendants who committed their crimes
before age eighteen); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (concluding that “death is not a suitable punishment for a
mentally retarded criminal”).
57. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
58. Id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312).
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–80 (1976) (finding consensus in favor of the
death penalty as shown by thirty-five state legislatures’ enactment of new death penalty statutes after
Furman v. Georgia).
61. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
62. Id.
63. The Court cited a study reporting that 109 juvenile offenders were serving life without
parole sentences for non-homicides nationwide. See id. at 2023 (citing P. A NNINO, D. RASMUSSEN, & C.
RICE, J UVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR N ON-H OMICIDE OFFENSES: FLORIDA COMPARED TO
NATION 12 (2009), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/faculty/profiles/annino/Report_juvenile_
lwop_092009.pdf). After the State of Florida criticized the study as inaccurate and incomplete, id. at
2023–24, the Court conducted its own inquiry, which brought the tally to 123, id. at 2024.
64. Id.
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Moreover, the Court reasoned, the evidence of consensus was not
undermined by the fact that many jurisdictions do not explicitly prohibit the
practice of sentencing juveniles to life without parole for non-homicides.65
The fact that the practice is permitted, the Court explained, “does not justify
a judgment that many States intended to subject [juvenile] offenders to life
without parole sentences.”66 Instead, it was the movement away from
treating juvenile crime in juvenile court to trying juveniles as adults that
had created the possibility for such extreme sentences to be imposed on
those not yet adult in any sense of the word. As the Court recognized,
“[o]nce in adult court, a juvenile offender may receive the same sentence as
would be given to an adult offender, including a life without parole
sentence.”67 Even so, the actual use of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders was “exceedingly rare.”68 Based on that fact and the
other objective indicia of the nation’s evolving standards of decency, the
Court concluded that a national consensus had developed against sentencing
juvenile offenders to life without parole.69
The Court then proceeded to “exercise [its] independent judgment,”
which required “consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in
light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the
punishment in question.”70 As part of that exercise, the “Court considere[d]
whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological
goals.”71 Here, the Court looked directly to Roper v. Simmons, its 2005
decision holding that the death penalty violated juveniles’ Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments.72 “Roper
65. Id. at 2025.
66. Id. The Court elaborated:
[T]he statutory eligibility of a juvenile offender for life without parole does not
indicate that the penalty has been endorsed through deliberate, express, and full
legislative consideration. Similarly, the many States that allow life without parole
for juvenile nonhomicide offenders but do not impose the punishment should not
be treated as if they have expressed the view that the sentence is appropriate.
Id. at 2026.
67. Id. at 2025. The Court pointed out the extreme nature of the transition to adult penalties:
For example, under Florida law a child of any age can be prosecuted as an adult
for certain crimes and can be sentenced to life without parole. The State [of
Florida] acknowledged at oral argument that even a 5-year old, theoretically,
could receive such a sentence under the letter of the law.
Id. at 2025–26.
68. Id. at 2026.
69. Id. (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
70. Id. (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436–39 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 568 (2005); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)).
71. Id. (citing Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 439–47; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571–72; Atkins, 536 U.S. at
318–20).
72. Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–73).
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established that because juveniles have lessened culpability[,] they are less
deserving of the most severe punishments.”73 The Roper Court had
concluded that juveniles possess a lower level of culpability based on three
general differences between juveniles and adults:
First, as any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological
studies . . . tend to confirm, “[a] lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more
often than in adults and are more understandable among the
young. These qualities often result in impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions.”74

It is precisely that “comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of
juveniles[]” that had led “almost every State [to] prohibit[] those under 18
years of age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental
consent.”75 The second difference was that “juveniles are more vulnerable
or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure.”76 The Court observed that juveniles’ particular vulnerability “is
explained in part by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles have less
control, or less experience with control, over their own environment.”77 The
Court concluded by recognizing a “third broad difference” between
juveniles and adults—“the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as
that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less
fixed.”78
The Roper Court then explained the implications of the three
differences that set juveniles apart from adults. First, “[t]he susceptibility of
juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means ‘their irresponsible
conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.’”79 Second,
juveniles’ “own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their
73. Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–71).
74. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)) (citing
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 445 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (“Even the normal 16-year-old customarily lacks
the maturity of an adult.”)). The Court also recognized that “adolescents are overrepresented statistically
in virtually every category of reckless behavior.” Id. (quoting Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in
Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 339 (1992)).
75. Id. at 569, 581–87 (referring to the Court’s Appendices B–D, which provide an exhaustive
list of minimum-age requirements for voting, jury service, and “marriage without parental or judicial
consent,” respectively).
76. Id. at 569 (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115).
77. Id. (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003) (“[A]s legal minors, [juveniles] lack the freedom that adults have to
extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting.”).
78. Id. at 570 (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)).
79. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
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immediate surroundings mean [they] have a greater claim than adults to be
forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their whole
environment.”80 Finally, “[t]he reality that juveniles still struggle to define
their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous
crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved
character.”81 Thus, the Roper Court concluded that, from a moral
standpoint, a juvenile’s transgressions cannot be equated with those of an
adult because a juvenile is more susceptible to reform than an adult.82 The
Court explained that “[t]he relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives
from the fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as
individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate
in younger years can subside.”83
These differences and their implications for assessing culpability drove
the Court’s decision in Roper, and the Graham Court found no reason to
reconsider the Roper Court’s conclusions.84 Instead, Graham found even
more support for treating juveniles differently from adults.
“[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science continue to show
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example,
parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through
late adolescence.”85 Because “[j]uveniles are more capable of change than
are adults,”86 Graham concluded, “[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be
misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be
reformed.”87
The Court turned next to the nature of the offenses to which the “harsh
penalty”88 of life without parole might apply. Acknowledging “that
defendants who do not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken
are categorically less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment

80. Id. (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993)); see also Steinberg & Scott,
supra note 77, at 1014 (“For most teens, [risky or antisocial] behaviors are fleeting; they cease with
maturity as individual identity becomes settled. Only a relatively small proportion of adolescents who
experiment in risky or illegal activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into
adulthood.”).
84. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
85. Id. (citing Brief for Am. Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae at 16–24, Graham v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621); Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. as Amici
Curiae at 22–27, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2026–27 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
88. Id. at 2027.
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than are murderers,”89 the Court said that “[t]here is a line ‘between
homicide and other serious violent offenses against the individual.’”90
Crimes like robbery and rape “differ from homicide crimes in a moral
sense.”91 Thus, the Court concluded that “when compared to an adult
murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice
diminished moral culpability.”92
Having examined the age of the offender and nature of the crime, the
Court then turned to the punishment itself. The Court recognized the
harshness of life without parole for juveniles, “the second most severe
penalty permitted by law,”93 based on the sheer number of years a juvenile
offender will serve in prison compared to an adult, particularly an adult of
advanced years.94 Like the death penalty, life without parole “alters the
offender’s life by a forfeiture that is irrevocable. It deprives the convict of
the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration . . . .”95 The
deprivation is most severe for juvenile offenders, for as the Court observed,
“[a] 16-year old and a 75-year old each sentenced to life without parole
receive the same punishment in name only.”96
The Court then considered the penological justifications for the
practice of sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole. The Court
took as its starting point the principle that “[a] sentence lacking any
legitimate penological justification is by its nature disproportionate to the
offense.”97 Life without parole for juvenile offenders, the Court concluded,
finds no adequate justification in any of the four penological goals
recognized as legitimate.98 First, “retribution does not justify imposing the
second most severe penalty on the less culpable juvenile nonhomicide
offender.”99 Second, deterrence does not justify the sentence “in light of
juvenile nonhomicide offenders’ diminished moral responsibility.”100 Third,
89. Id. (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436–39 (2008); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)).
90. Id. (quoting Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 438).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2016 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
94. Id. at 2028.
95. Id. at 2027 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983)).
96. Id. at 2028 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at
996).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (“The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly
related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.” (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137,
149 (1987))) (“[T]he case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.” (quoting Roper,
543 U.S. at 571)).
100. Id. at 2029. “[T]he same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults
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incapacitation does not warrant a life without parole sentence because it
“denies the juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and
maturity.”101 The Court also warned that “[i]ncapacitation cannot override
all other considerations, lest the Eighth Amendment’s rule against
disproportionate sentences be a nullity.”102 Fourth and last, rehabilitation
does not justify the sentence because it “forswears altogether the
rehabilitative ideal.”103
The absence of any penological justification, the diminished culpability
of juvenile offenders, and “the severity of life without parole sentences” all
led the Court to conclude that sentencing juvenile non-homicide offenders
to life without parole is cruel and unusual and therefore forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment.104 But the Court did not go so far as to require that all
juvenile offenders be released from prison. Instead, the Court maintained
that it was sufficient that they be given some possibility of gaining release:
“A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile
offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must do,
however, is give defendants like Graham some meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”105
The Court then explained why it was necessary to adopt a categorical
rule against juvenile life without parole. First, a “clear line is necessary to
prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will be imposed on
juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are not sufficiently culpable to merit
that punishment.”106 A categorical rule is necessary because, while a state’s
“laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be
flawed,”107 some state statutes required consideration of the defendant’s
age, yet still were “insufficient to prevent the possibility that the [juvenile]
offender will receive a life without parole sentence for which he or she
lacks the moral culpability.”108
The Court also said that creating a rule requiring sentencers to consider
the juvenile offender’s age, weighed against the seriousness of the crime in
suggest . . . that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.” Id. at 2028 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at
571).
101. Id. (“To justify life without parole on the assumption that the juvenile offender forever will
be a danger to society requires the sentencer to make a judgment that the juvenile is incorrigible. The
characteristics of juveniles make that judgment questionable.”).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2030 (“By denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the State makes
an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and place in society. This judgment is not appropriate
in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for change and limited moral culpability.”).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2031.
108. Id.
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a case-by-case gross disproportionality inquiry, would not adequately
protect juvenile offenders.109 “The case-by-case approach to sentencing
must, however, be confined by some boundaries. The dilemma of juvenile
sentencing demonstrates this.”110 The Court illustrated the point by positing
a juvenile offender of “sufficient psychological maturity” and a crime
reflecting “sufficient depravity” to warrant the most severe penalty.111 Even
then, the Court said that “it does not follow that courts taking a case-bycase proportionality approach could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the
few incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that have the capacity for
change.”112
Continuing with its explanation, the Court noted the “special
difficulties encountered by counsel in juvenile representation.”113 The Court
stated the truism that “[j]uveniles mistrust adults and have limited
understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the
institutional actors within it. They are less likely than adults to work
effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense.”114 Moreover,
juveniles are impulsive and have difficulty weighing long-term
consequences, which can lead to poor decisions and, as a result, impaired
legal representation.115 “A categorical rule” protects juvenile offenders from
those deficiencies and “avoids the risk that . . . a court or jury will
erroneously conclude that a particular juvenile is sufficiently culpable to
deserve life without parole for a nonhomicide.”116
“Finally, a categorical rule gives all juvenile[s]” serving life without
parole for non-homicides “a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.”117
The Court explained: “Maturity can lead to that considered reflection which
is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation. . . . A categorical
rule against life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders avoids
the perverse consequence in which the lack of maturity that led to an
offender’s crime is reinforced by the prison term.”118

109. Id. at 2031–32
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2032 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 7–12, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621));
Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child’s
Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE D AME L. REV. 245, 272–73 (2005)).
115. Id. (citing Brief of J. Lawrence Aber et al. as Amici Curie Supporting Petitioners at 35,
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2032–33.
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The Court concluded its analysis by noting that life without parole for
juvenile non-homicide offenders is “a sentencing practice rejected the world
over.”119 While not dispositive, the judgments of other nations are “not
irrelevant.”120 As with the juvenile death penalty the Court rejected in
Roper, “‘the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its
face against’ life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.”121
Although international law in no way prohibits the United States from
sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole, the “overwhelming
weight of international opinion against” the sentence provided “respected
and significant confirmation for [the Court’s] own conclusions.”122
Taken together, all of the factors the Court considered led to one
conclusion: Sentencing juveniles to spend their entire lives in prison with
no opportunity to seek parole is cruel and unusual and therefore violates the
Eighth Amendment.123 The Court’s ruling is both remarkable and
unremarkable. It is unremarkable precisely because it relies on Roper’s
recognition that juveniles do not think or act like adults and that those
differences are of constitutional significance. And it is remarkable in that,
without pausing, the Court deftly applied its capital jurisprudence in the
context of a non-capital sentence. The following section shows just how
119. Id. at 2033.
120. Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982)).
121. Id. at 2034 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005)).
122. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 578).
123. Id. Justice Stevens concurred in the majority decision and was joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Sotomayor. Id. at 2036 (Stevens, J., concurring). The concurrence is quite short, and its apparent
purpose was to deflect Justice Thomas’s dissent. Justice Stevens noted that Justice Thomas had argued
that the Court’s holding was not entirely consistent with the Court’s rulings in its term-of-years
proportionality decisions. Id. That being the case, Justice Stevens said, the dissents in those cases (of
which Justice Stevens was the primary author) “more accurately describe the law today than Justice
Thomas’s rigid interpretation of the Amendment.” Id. Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the judgment
that Terrance Graham’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment, but the Chief Justice would not have
crossed the “death is different” divide. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring). He would have analyzed
Graham’s sentence using the case-by-case approach that employs the “narrow proportionality review of
noncapital” cases, informed by Roper’s conclusion that “juvenile offenders are generally less culpable
than adults who commit the same crimes.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Thomas filed a
strenuous dissent, taking the Court to task for its application of the categorical approach to this case
involving a non-capital offense. Id. at 2043 (Thomas, J., dissenting). To Justice Thomas, the Graham
decision was a wholly improper imposition of the Court’s “own sense of morality and retributive justice
[on] that of the people and their representatives.” Id. at 2058. Finally, Justice Alito wrote a separate
dissent, making two points: First, he said, nothing in the Court’s holding prevents a sentence of a term of
years without possibility of parole; and second, the question whether Graham’s sentence violated the
narrow proportionality principle of the Court’s non-capital cases was not properly before the Court
because Graham abandoned that argument in favor of a categorical rule. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting). Of
course, the Court had relied on the categorical approach in deciding the case, so Justice Alito’s comment
seems oddly critical of Chief Justice Roberts, who reached the same conclusion as the majority based on
the narrow proportionality analysis reserved for a case-by-case inquiry. See id. at 2036–42 (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
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remarkable that was by tracing the development of two very distinct lines of
Eighth Amendment analysis: one for death penalty cases and another for
cases involving all other sentences.
III. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN DEATH AND NON-DEATH CASES:
WORLDS APART
By using death penalty analysis in a non-death case, the Graham Court,
as Justice Thomas lamented, embarked on virgin territory.124 Nearly four
decades of the modern death penalty era passed without a breach in the wall
separating capital from non-capital sentencing review. Those years saw the
Court’s “death is different” capital jurisprudence flourish while prisoners
serving long sentences saw their chances of gaining relief diminish with
each Supreme Court decision.125 How these distinctive analytical paths
developed, despite their interpretation of the same Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, is the subject of what
follows.
A. The Evolution of the Court’s “Death Is Different” Jurisprudence
The modern era of death penalty law has its origin, most would
agree,126 in the 1972 decision Furman v. Georgia,127 in which the Court
124. Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
125. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1151–57, 1186–93 (2009)
(arguing for abandonment of the two-tier approach to sentencing review because of its failure as a matter
of both law and policy); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049,
1051 (2004) (critiquing the inconsistency in the Court’s death penalty and prison sentence cases); Carol
S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall? The Effect of Eighth Amendment
Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 164–
65 (2008) (describing conflicts in the interests of capital and non-capital defendants and how death
penalty reforms may undermine reform in the non-capital system). The one exception to the increasingly
stringent, and completely unforgiving, non-capital line of cases is Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983),
and, as discussed infra, its ray of hope was short-lived. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996
(1991).
126. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on
Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 361–62
(1995) (noting that the history of death penalty law could begin with a number of different cases, but
that Furman is the “fairly conventional” choice); see also STUART BANNER , THE D EATH PENALTY: A N
AMERICAN HISTORY 267 (2002) (noting that the Furman decision “touched off the biggest flurry of
capital punishment legislation the nation had ever seen”).
127. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam). The opinion consisted of
one paragraph invalidating the death sentences for the three petitioners. Justices filed their own separate
concurring opinions. See id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring). The
remaining four Justices filed separate dissents, often joining in the others’ opinions. See id. at 375
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struck down the death penalties imposed on three men under the Eighth
Amendment.128 Only Justices Brennan and Marshall argued that the death
penalty was on its face a cruel and unusual punishment always prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment.129 Three other Justices—Douglas, Stewart, and
White—explicitly reserved judgment on the question whether a less
arbitrary, more circumscribed death penalty sentencing scheme than those
before the Court could withstand constitutional scrutiny.130 The effect of the
Furman ruling was to abolish the death penalty everywhere it existed—in
thirty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and under federal law.131
Four years later, the Court disappointed everyone who had hoped that
Furman spelled the end of the death penalty in America132 when it returned
to the subject in Gregg v. Georgia133 and its four companion cases.134 If any

(Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.); id. at 405 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ.);
id. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun and Powell, JJ.). The Furman
decision was the longest in the Court’s history at that time. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 125, at 165.
128. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40 (striking down capital sentences for two men convicted of
rape—one in Texas and one in Georgia—and one convicted of murder, also in Georgia; all three were
black).
129. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“When examined by the principles applicable under
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, death stands condemned as fatally offensive to human
dignity.”); id. at 358–59 (Marshall, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring). “[T]hese discretionary statutes are unconstitutional
in their operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not
compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws . . . .” Id. at 256–57, 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (“I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the
infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly
and so freakishly imposed.”); id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (“That conclusion, as I have said, is that
the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious crimes and that there is
no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not.”). Justice White also opined that “capital punishment . . . has for all practical purposes
run its course.” Id.
131. Id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Rhode Island’s was the only death penalty that
escaped the Court’s judgment because it was completely non-discretionary—it imposed a mandatory
death penalty for a life prisoner who commits murder. Id. at 307 (Stewart, J., concurring). Rhode
Island’s law was not invalidated until 1976, when the Court rejected mandatory sentencing. See Roberts
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality
opinion); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 126, at 362 n.22 (“Only Rhode Island’s capital
punishment law was left untouched by Furman in 1972, because it was wholly nondiscretionary and
thus not invalidated until the Court later rejected mandatory sentencing in 1976.”).
132. See, e.g., MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, at xi (1973). Meltsner was one of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education
Fund lawyers who were involved in the Furman litigation. The book, which tells the story of the
Furman case, begins with an introduction in which Meltsner praises the Fund’s role in leading to the
abolition of the death penalty and thereby “right[ing] a deeply felt, historic wrong.” Id.; see also Steiker
& Steiker, supra note 126, at 362 (“Indeed, the main question left in the wake of Furman was whether
there would be any future cases.”).
133. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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doubt about the vitality of the death penalty remained before the Court took
up those cases, no one could claim ignorance after the Court ruled. As death
penalty scholars Carol and Jordan Steiker have explained: “The extent to
which Furman was a beginning and not an end to constitutional regulation
of the death penalty became clear only in 1976, when the Gregg Court
considered five new state statutory schemes in light of its decision in
Furman.”135 Gregg minced no words in affirming the constitutional
viability of capital sentencing: “We now hold that the punishment of death
does not invariably violate the Constitution.”136
As it waded into the business of regulating capital sentencing, the
Gregg Court declined to chart the definitive features necessary for a
constitutional death penalty system.137 Rather, the Court examined each
statute individually, gauging whether it measured up to the norm recognized
by the Court in the 1958 case, Trop v. Dulles: “the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”138 That examination,
the Court emphasized, “does not call for a subjective judgment. It requires,
rather, that we look to objective indicia that reflect the public attitude
toward a given sanction.”139 The clearest indication of the public attitude
toward the death penalty, the Gregg Court said, was the thirty-five state
legislatures that enacted new death penalty statutes after Furman.140 So too,
juries are a “significant and reliable objective index of contemporary
values.”141
Those measures of “acceptab[ility] to contemporary society,” however,
were not sufficient to meet Eighth Amendment standards; a challenged
punishment must also “comport[] with the basic concept of human dignity

134. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 325; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 280; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
135. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 126, at 363.
136. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169.
137. Id. at 195 (“We do not intend to suggest that only the above-described procedures would be
permissible under Furman or that any sentencing system constructed along these general lines would
inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman, for each distinct system must be examined on an individual
basis.”).
138. Id. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding that the
denationalization of a person convicted by court martial of desertion, but giving no aid to any foreign
power, violated the Eighth Amendment)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 179–80. Congress, too, enacted a death penalty statute in 1974, limited to aircraft
piracy that results in death. Id. at 180.
141. Id. at 181 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 439–40 (Powell, J., dissenting)). See
also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293, 295 (1976) (finding general juror reluctance to
convict when the death penalty was mandatory and reluctance to impose the death penalty when given
the discretion to sentence the defendant to life in prison).
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at the core of the [Eighth] Amendment.”142 The Court explained that a
punishment “totally without penological justification [would] result[] in the
gratuitous infliction of suffering”143 and thereby violate that core concept.
The Court said that applying the death penalty for certain grievous crimes
serves two penological purposes—retribution and deterrence—and
therefore does not violate human dignity in those instances.144 However,
where any capital sentencing scheme affords discretion to the sentencer,
“that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the
risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action” to survive constitutional
scrutiny.145
The Court then proceeded to uphold three states’ death penalty
statutes—those of Florida, Georgia, and Texas—based on their particular
statutory schemes’ mix of procedural protections.146 The Court approved
the statutes because each was a “carefully drafted statute that ensures that
the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance.”147
Making the death penalty mandatory for certain crimes, however, went too
far and caused the Court to strike down as unconstitutional the death
penalty statutes in the two remaining cases.148 In Woodson, the Court
rejected North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty statute and set the issue
in its historic context: “The history of mandatory death penalty statutes in
the United States . . . reveals that the practice of sentencing to death all
persons convicted of a particular offense has been rejected as unduly harsh
142. Id. at 182 (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 (plurality opinion) (“The basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”)).
143. Id. at 183 (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S.
130, 135–36 (1878)).
144. Id. at 183, 186–87.
145. Id. at 189.
146. See id. at 196–98 (approving a statutory scheme that narrowed the class of murderers
subject to the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding, finding at least one statutory
aggravating factor, permitting consideration of other aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and
providing for automatic appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276
(1976) (approving a statutory scheme that narrowed its definition of capital murder, requiring a jury to
consider five categories of aggravating circumstances, permitting consideration of mitigating
circumstances, focusing on the particular circumstances of the individual offense and individual
offender, and providing for prompt appeal); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252, 258–60 (1976)
(approving a statutory scheme that required an advisory jury and judge to weigh eight aggravating
factors against seven mitigating factors to determine whether the death sentence is warranted based on
the particular circumstances of the offense and particular characteristics of the offender and providing
for automatic appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida);.
147. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
148. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331–36 (1976) (holding that a Louisiana death penalty
statute that mandated the death sentence for certain crimes violated the Eighth Amendment); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 292–305 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that a North Carolina death
penalty statute that mandated the death sentence for all first degree murders violated the Eighth
Amendment).

2011]

Death Is Not So Different After All

19

and unworkably rigid.”149 The Court continued, stating the basis for its
conclusion: “The two crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency
respecting the imposition of punishment in our society—jury
determinations and legislative enactments—both point conclusively to the
repudiation of automatic death sentences.”150 The fatal problem for both
North Carolina and Louisiana was that their statutes provided no standards
to guide jurors in deciding whether a case was first-degree murder and
subject to the death penalty or not.151
The upshot of the Gregg opinions for death penalty jurisprudence was
to entrench the Court in an ongoing regulatory role unlike any it would ever
take on in the non-capital context.152 And so began the “death is different”
era.153
One year after Gregg, the Court again considered the Georgia death
penalty statute. In Coker v. Georgia, the Court struck down the death
penalty as a disproportionate sentence for the rape of an adult woman.154
With its consideration of the Eighth Amendment question, the four-person
plurality established the general contours of the analytical framework the
Court has used in every case since Coker to determine whether the death
penalty is an excessive punishment under the Eighth Amendment.155
The Coker plurality first stressed that the determination whether a
punishment is excessive “should be informed by objective factors to the
maximum possible extent.”156 As in Gregg, the Court considered two
objective factors. It looked first to what the states had legislated.157 There,
the Court concluded that never in the preceding fifty years had a majority of
states authorized the death penalty for rape, and at the time of the Coker
decision, only Georgia had made the rape of an adult woman a capital
offense.158 The Court also considered international law and opinion for the
149. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 292–93.
150. Id. at 293.
151. Id. at 301–04 (invalidating a statutory scheme that provided no guided discretion in
mandatory sentencing and no consideration of particular circumstances of the offense or the offender,
which are essential to “the evolving standards of decency” (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)); Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335–36 (invalidating a statutory scheme that required instructions on
second degree murder and manslaughter even if no evidence supported the charges because it created
standardless jury decisions).
152. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 126, at 363.
153. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286–91 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that
death differs from other punishments not merely in degree but in kind, and that because of its severity
and finality, has always been cruel and unusual).
154. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion). The plurality was comprised of
four Justices, with Justices Brennan and Marshall again separately concurring.
155. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 125, at 178.
156. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
157. Id. at 593–95.
158. Id. at 594–95. Before Furman invalidated the death penalty nationwide in 1972, sixteen
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first time—here, as a component of its legislative analysis159—by stating
that it was “not irrelevant” that only three of sixty nations surveyed in 1965
“retained the death penalty for rape.”160 The second objective factor the
Court examined was jury decisions.161 There too, the Court found little
support for imposing the death penalty for rape because Georgia juries had
rendered the sentence only six times since Furman, a number which
accounted for only ten percent of all rape sentences during those five
years.162
The Court then turned from consideration of objective indicia of
consensus against the death penalty to the exercise of its own independent
judgment: “[F]or the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”163 Bringing that judgment to
bear on the acceptability of the death penalty for rape, the Coker plurality
acknowledged the “seriousness of rape”: “It is highly reprehensible, both in
a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and
states made the rape of an adult woman a capital offense, but by 1977, Georgia’s statute was the sole
remnant of that capital sentencing history. Id. at 593–94. At the time, three other states, Florida,
Mississippi, and Tennessee, authorized the death penalty for the rape of a child by an adult. Id. at 595.
159. In later cases, the Court has considered the international community in bringing its own
judgment to bear on the constitutionality of the death penalty, rather than as a part of its legislative
review. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577–78 (2005) (holding as unconstitutional under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments laws imposing the death penalty on offenders who were under
the age of 18 at the time of their crime, and noting that the “overwhelming weight of international
opinion [was] against [a] juvenile death penalty”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988)
(holding as unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment laws that allow imposing the death penalty on
offenders who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their offense and noting that this ruling is
consistent with “other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of
the Western European community” (footnote omitted)). Of all the factors that comprise the Court’s
searching review of death penalty cases, the views of the international community is the one most
criticized by dissenting Justices. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 622–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J.) (“Though the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the
Court’s decision today, the views of other countries and the so-called international community take
center stage.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324–25 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by
Scalia and Thomas, JJ.) (“I fail to see, however, how the views of other countries regarding the
punishment of their citizens provide any support for the Court’s ultimate determination.”); Thompson,
487 U.S. at 868–69 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by White, J.). Justice Scalia opined:
In the present case, therefore, the fact that a majority of foreign nations would not
impose capital punishment upon persons under 16 at the time of the crime is of no
more relevance than the fact that a majority of them would not impose capital
punishment at all, or have standards of due process quite different from our own.
Id.
160. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10 (citing UNITED NATIONS, D EP’T OF ECON. & SOC . AFFAIRS,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 40, 86 (1968)).
161. Id. at 596.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 597.

2011]

Death Is Not So Different After All

21

autonomy of the female victim . . . . Short of homicide, it is the ‘ultimate
violation of self.’”164 But when compared to murder, which ends a life, the
Court regarded rape as less deserving of the ultimate punishment.165
Therefore, the death penalty for rape was an excessive punishment that
violated the Eighth Amendment.166 By declaring the death penalty off-limits
for a particular offense, the Coker Court launched what would become a
series of categorical rulings that set and re-set the boundaries of the death
penalty in America.
In the first of those cases, the Court faced “the question whether death
is a valid penalty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for one
who neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.”167 In
Enmund v. Florida, Justice White, who wrote for the Coker plurality, wrote
for the majority. He applied the Coker methodology168 to vacate the death
sentence of a getaway driver who was convicted of felony murder, but who
neither attempted or intended to kill nor participated in the killing.169 The
Court’s analysis expanded on Coker in two respects: first, by considering
the number of actual executions of non-triggermen since 1955 (none),170
and second, by requiring individualized consideration of the capital
offender’s character and record.171 Here, Florida had treated Enmund the

164. Id. (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 598.
166. Id. (“Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly
so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair.”).
167. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787 (1982).
168. Id. at 789–801. The Court again tallied the number of jurisdictions that authorized the death
penalty in those circumstances—eight, id. at 792, and the number of such defendants whom juries had
sentenced to death in the ten years post-Furman—just three, including the petitioner, id. at 795. Noting
that “it is for us ultimately to judge,” the Court then exercised its independent judgment. Id. at 797. As
in Coker, the defendant had not taken a life and so did not deserve the ultimate punishment. Id. The
Court’s analysis concluded with its rejection of the “two principal social purposes” of capital
punishment—retribution and deterrence. Id. at 798–99 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183
(1976)). Both failed as legitimate social purposes. Id. at 798–801.
169. Id. at 801. Enmund’s holding lasted only five years. In Tison v. Arizona, the Court
reaffirmed the Coker methodology but held that, because the legislative landscape and number of jury
verdicts against defendants for felony murder had changed dramatically since Enmund, allowing the
death penalty without a showing of intent was no longer excessive under the Eighth Amendment. 481
U.S. 137, 154 (1987). Thus, the Court brought its own judgment to bear and concluded that a participant
in a felony murder who did not intend to kill but who evinced a “reckless indifference to human life”
could receive the death penalty without offending the Constitution. Id. at 158.
170. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 794–95.
171. Id. at 798 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)); see also Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 104 (1982) (reversing and remanding for consideration of all mitigating
factors, including Eddings’s youth (he was sixteen years old), his turbulent and often violent family life,
his emotional disturbance, and his mental and emotional developmental problems).
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same as his co-defendants who had killed, which the Court held was
“impermissible under the Eighth Amendment.”172
After Enmund, the Court’s attention was drawn away from categories
of offenses for which the death penalty was an unconstitutional punishment
to categories of offenders whose execution was said to offend the Eighth
Amendment. The first such case the Court considered, Thompson v.
Oklahoma,173 was decided in 1988; two additional cases, Penry v.
Lynaugh174 and Stanford v. Kentucky,175 were both decided on the same day
the following year.
William Wayne Thompson was fifteen years old when he “actively
participated” with three older persons in a brutal murder.176 Like his adult
co-defendants, Thompson was sentenced to death.177 In a now familiar
litany, the Court previewed its analysis: “[W]e first review relevant
legislative enactments, then refer to jury determinations, and finally explain
why these indicators of contemporary standards of decency confirm our
judgment that such a young person is not capable of acting with the degree
of culpability that can justify the ultimate penalty.”178 To reach that
conclusion, the Court also considered new categories of information—
various statutes relating to the treatment of those under sixteen years of age
as minors,179 the views of respected professional organizations,180 and wellestablished developmental differences between juveniles and adults that
make juveniles less culpable.181 Based on that analysis, the Court
established a categorical bar against imposition of the death penalty on a
person under the age of sixteen.182

172. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798.
173. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
174. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
175. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
176. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 819.
177. Id. at 818.
178. Id. at 822–23 (footnotes omitted). The states’ death penalty statutes, for the most part, did
not establish a minimum age for imposition of the death penalty, id. at 826, but all eighteen states that
expressly established a minimum age required the defendant to be at least sixteen, id. at 829. During the
period 1982 through 1986, only five defendants who received the death penalty, including Thompson,
were younger than sixteen at the time of the offense, compared with 1,388 who were sixteen or older. Id.
at 832–33. Based on all of the factors it considered, the Court concluded that the imposition of the death
penalty on one so young did not serve either of the social purposes of the death penalty—neither
retribution nor deterrence. Id. at 836–38.
179. Id. at 824.
180. Id. at 830.
181. Id. at 833–35.
182. Id. at 838. The Court declined the entreaties of Thompson’s counsel and various amici
curiae for the Court to “draw a line” protecting anyone under the age of eighteen from the death penalty,
restricting itself to “the case before us.” Id.
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The following year, the Court backtracked when it rejected two
categorical challenges on the same day. In Penry v. Lynaugh, the Court
found no national consensus against the execution of mentally retarded
persons.183 In Stanford v. Kentucky, it reached the same conclusion
regarding juveniles aged sixteen and seventeen at the time of their
offenses.184 In neither case did state statutes or jury sentencing decisions
persuade the Court to prohibit the death penalty for the specific category of
offenders.185 While admonishing the states to provide for consideration of
all mitigating evidence in each individualized sentencing decision,186 the
Court was not prepared to go further. The Stanford plurality even went so
far as to reject the principle that the Court should bring its own judgment to
bear in deciding the acceptability of the juvenile death penalty.187
By 2002, however, the Court was ready to reconsider the question
whether execution of a mentally retarded person offends the Eighth
Amendment. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court found the national consensus
against such executions that it had found wanting in Penry.188 Writing for
the Court, Justice Stevens began with a simple acknowledgement: “Much
has changed since then.”189 And indeed, much had changed in the Court’s
expanding endorsement of considerations relevant to the question whether a
national consensus existed.
Only eighteen states expressly prohibited the punishment; of those,
sixteen had changed their laws in the past decade to bar execution of the
mentally retarded.190 Clearly, nothing close to a majority of states
prohibited the practice, but that did not trouble the Court. Instead, Justice
Stevens reasoned for the first time in a capital case that “[i]t is not so much
the number of these States that is significant, but the consistency of the
direction of change.”191 Every state legislature that had acted since Penry
183. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 344 (1989) (stating that only two state statutes prohibited
execution of the mentally retarded).
184. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370–71 (1989) (observing that only twelve states
declined to impose the death penalty on seventeen-year-olds and fifteen states declined to impose it on
sixteen-year-olds).
185. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334–35; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370–74.
186. Penry, 492 U.S. at 340; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375.
187. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377–78 (plurality opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
White and Kennedy, JJ.).
188. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315–16 (2002) (finding that nearly twenty states had
exempted the mentally retarded from the death penalty since Penry and that even in states permitting
such executions “the practice [was] uncommon,” with only five offenders having IQs under seventy
executed during the same time).
189. Id. at 314.
190. See id. (noting that, by 1989, fourteen states had barred capital punishment for the mentally
retarded and that in the 1990s several states passed laws also barring capital punishment for the mentally
retarded).
191. Id. at 315 (footnote omitted).
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had enacted a prohibition against the execution of the mentally retarded,192
and the federal government had done the same when it amended the federal
death penalty law in 1994.193 Moreover, even in states with no prohibition
against the execution of the mentally retarded, only five had executed such
offenders since Penry.194 The Court then cited, again for the first time,
additional support for the prohibition from organizations with expertise in
mental retardation, diverse religious communities, the world community,
and polling data showing widespread consensus among Americans that
executing the mentally retarded is wrong.195 While “by no means
dispositive, [the] consistency” of those data with the legislative history
“len[t] further support to [the Court’s] conclusion that there is a consensus
among those who have addressed the issue.”196
Moving on from its demonstration of a consensus against executing the
mentally retarded, the Court next elaborated “two reasons consistent with
the legislative consensus that the mentally retarded should be categorically
excluded from execution.”197 The first is that “a serious question” exists
whether either retribution or deterrence, the justifications the Court has
recognized for the death penalty, apply to the mentally retarded because of
their diminished culpability and diminished ability to control their
behavior.198 The second is that the reduced capacity of mentally retarded
persons makes them more likely to make false confessions or be bad
witnesses and less likely to provide meaningful assistance to their
counsel.199 Thus, they “face a special risk of wrongful execution.”200
Finally, bringing its independent judgment to bear, the Court found no
reason to disagree with the state legislatures that had acted in recent
years,201 concluding that execution of the mentally retarded was “excessive”
and therefore unconstitutional.202
The Court did not hand down a similar ruling for juveniles on the day it
decided Atkins as it had with Stanford and Penry thirteen years earlier.
However, the Court returned to that question three years later in Roper v.
Simmons, where it chose to follow Atkins’s lead.203 First, the Roper Court

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 314–15.
Id. at 314 n.10 (citing Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (2000)).
Id. at 316.
Id. at 316 n.21.
Id. at 317 n.21 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 & n.30, 831 (1988)).
Id. at 318.
Id.
Id. at 320–21.
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563–64 (2005).
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found evidence of a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty
similar to that in Atkins.204 Here, too, it was “the consistency of the
direction of change” that was significant.205 Next, the Court exercised its
independent judgment and considered at length whether juveniles fall
within the “narrow category of crimes and offenders” for which the death
penalty is reserved.206 Because of the three general differences between
juveniles and adults207 discussed above in connection with Graham, the
Court concluded that juveniles did not fall within that “narrow category.”208
For those same reasons, neither retribution nor deterrence was a sufficient
penological justification for the continued existence of the juvenile death
penalty.209 The Court also expressly denounced the Stanford plurality’s
rejection of the constitutional requirement that the Court “bring its
independent judgment to bear on the proportionality of the death penalty for
a particular class of crimes or offenders.”210
Finally, the Court considered “the stark reality that the United States is
the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the
juvenile death penalty”211 and that “[t]he opinion[s] of the world
community, while not controlling . . . provide respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions.”212 Moreover, the “affirmation of
certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores
the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.”213
And so the United States joined the rest of the world in repudiating the
execution of juveniles.
The final case in this catalog of the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence
is Kennedy v. Louisiana, a categorical ruling in which the Court held that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child.214
204. Id. at 564–65 (eighteen states explicitly excluded juveniles from the death penalty, and
twelve more rejected the death penalty for anyone; even in the remaining states, executing juveniles was
rare).
205. Id. at 566 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315) (explaining that the number of states that
abandoned the juvenile death penalty after Stanford was smaller than those abandoning execution of the
mentally retarded, but more states had always prohibited execution of juveniles).
206. Id. at 569.
207. Id. at 569–70 (“These differences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among
the worst offenders.”).
208. Id. at 569–71.
209. Id. at 571–72.
210. Id. at 574 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377–78 (1989) (plurality opinion))
(“[I]t suffices to note that this rejection was inconsistent with prior Eighth Amendment decisions.”
(citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833–38 (1988) (plurality opinion); Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982))).
211. Id. at 575.
212. Id. at 578.
213. Id.
214. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 469 (2008).
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Making the expected comparisons to Coker and its other decisions placing
certain offenses out of the death penalty’s reach, the Court began with an
examination of the relevant state statutes.215 The Court noted that Louisiana
had reintroduced the death penalty for the rape of a child in 1995216 and that
five other states had done the same.217 Here, the Court confronted
arguments from Louisiana that the newly enacted statutes, taken together
with those that had been proposed but were not yet enacted, “reflect[ed] a
consistent direction of change in support of the death penalty for child
rape.”218 The Court easily dispensed with the argument, finding “no
showing of consistent change”219 and no showing as significant as that in
Atkins 220 or Roper.221
Bringing its own judgment to bear, the Court acknowledged “the years
of long anguish that must be endured by the victim of child rape.”222 In the
end, however, the Court concluded that “the death penalty should not be
expanded to instances where the victim’s life was not taken.”223
Considering the social justifications for the death penalty, retribution “does
not justify the harshness of the death penalty here,”224 and because “the
death penalty adds to the risk of nonreporting” of incidents of child rape,
any deterrent effect it may have is diminished and cannot, therefore, support
its use.225 Taken together, all of these considerations demonstrated the
serious consequences of making child rape a capital offense and led the
Court “to conclude . . . that the death penalty is not a proportional
punishment for the rape of a child.”226
These cases show that what began with Gregg and was firmly
established by Coker continues to guide the Court in its scrutiny of
categorical death penalty challenges. The Court first looks to the objective
indicia of a national consensus against the use of the death penalty. If it
215. Id. at 428.
216. Id.
217. Id. (naming the states and the years when they reintroduced the death penalty for rape of a
child: Georgia, in 1999; Montana, in 1997; Oklahoma, in 2006; South Carolina, in 2006; and Texas, in
2007). The Court was required to dispel any notion that Coker had already made capital punishment for
child rape unconstitutional so that “[t]he small number of States that have enacted this penalty, then, is
relevant to determining whether there is a consensus against capital punishment for this crime.” Id. at
431.
218. Id. at 431.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 432 (identifying six states, compared with eighteen states in Atkins).
221. Id. at 432–33 (cataloging five new states, plus twelve that already prohibited the death
penalty for anyone under eighteen and fifteen states that prohibited it for anyone under seventeen).
222. Id. at 435.
223. Id. at 437.
224. Id. at 444.
225. Id. at 446.
226. Id. at 446.
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finds such a consensus, the Court then brings its independent judgment to
bear on whether the death penalty is excessive in a given instance. But the
contours of the Court’s analytical framework have been far from static. To
borrow the Court’s own language, “the consistency of the direction of
change” has been marked.227
In a number of its death penalty decisions, the Court has granted
legitimacy to an ever-expanding array of factors that can lead to the
conclusion that a national consensus exists or that can assist the Court in
exercising its independent judgment. For example, in Enmund, no
additional data were required to support the Court’s finding of a national
consensus against allowing the death penalty for a getaway driver.
However, in addition to legislative enactments and jury determinations, the
Court also considered the number of executions of persons like Enmund
that had occurred since 1955.228 The Enmund Court also expanded on the
Coker analysis by requiring individualized consideration of a capital
offender’s character and record.229 In Thompson, the Court considered a
wide range of laws that legally disable minors230 and for the first time
acknowledged the views of respected professional organizations and other
nations.231
But it was in Atkins that the Court’s expansive analytical framework
flourished. First, because no clear majority of states prohibited the
execution of the mentally retarded, the Court looked not to the mere number
of statutes enacted, but to the “direction of change.”232 The Roper Court
applied the same reasoning three years later in invalidating the death
penalty for juvenile offenders.233 Second, the Atkins Court cited support for
abolition of the death penalty for the mentally retarded from a variety of
groups not seen in earlier Supreme Court decisions, including organizations
for the mentally retarded, religious groups, and even American polling data
showing widespread consensus against execution of the mentally
retarded.234 Similarly, the Roper Court relied on the work of developmental
psychologists and adolescent psychiatric groups, as well as the opinions of
members of the international community.235
In the end, we are left today with a death penalty jurisprudence that is
both broad and deep. It is a body of law that the Court has displayed a
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794–95 (1982).
Id. at 798 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)).
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 824 (1988).
Id. at 830.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566 (2005).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–78.
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willingness to change, sometimes in response to societal changes, but at
other times against the current of popular opinion. With the death penalty,
the Court has not shied away from staking out a course unpopular with the
majority if it means protecting the rights of an accused who is less able, by
lack of maturity or mental acuity, to do so himself. All of this, of course, is
in the name of the Eighth Amendment. But, as the following section shows,
when that same amendment is invoked by one serving a non-capital
sentence, even an exceedingly long sentence for a seemingly minor offense,
it is as if two separate constitutional provisions exist. That such a separate
and distinct analytical framework exists for non-capital cases is beyond
dispute. The discussion that follows makes no attempt to answer the
question why such separate lines of jurisprudence have evolved when only
one Eighth Amendment governs all punishments,236 but rather seeks to
show what the Court has done to those who would challenge their noncapital sentences.
B. The Failed Promise of Non-Capital Proportionality Review
Anyone writing about Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, capital and
non-capital sentencing alike, generally begins with Weems v. United
States.237 In that 1910 decision, the Court held that being sentenced to
twelve years of “hard and painful labor” in chains238 for the crime of
falsifying a public document239 violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.240 Even as early as Weems, the Court
recognized two categories of punishment that would offend the Eighth
Amendment: “something inhuman and barbarous, torture and the like”241—
such as the punishment in Weems—and a term of years “so disproportionate
to the offense as to constitute a cruel and unusual punishment.”242 Thus,
236. The increasingly stringent test for non-capital proportionality may be yet another byproduct of the American criminal justice system’s misguided experiment with mass incarceration—a
means of stemming the floodgates, in effect. See generally MARIE G OTTSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE
GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2006); James Forman, Jr., Why Care
About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993 (2010); RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2008: DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY A ND PRACTICE 1 (2009), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/sl_statesentencingreport2008.pdf.
237. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
238. Id. at 364 (citation omitted).
239. Id. at 362–63. Weems was the disbursing officer of the Bureau of Coast Guard and
Transportation of the United States Government of the Philippine Islands and was convicted of entering
falsely the sums of 208 and 408 pesos as paid out to the lighthouse employees when the sums were not
paid. Id.
240. Id. at 381–82.
241. Id. at 368 (citing McDonald v. Commonwealth, 53 N.E. 874, 875 (Mass. 1999)).
242. Id. (quoting McDonald, 53 N.E. at 875).
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disproportionality in sentencing is a vice of long standing—a full century,
to be precise. After Weems, the future held promise for those challenging
lengthy prison terms.
The next significant Eighth Amendment case, nearly fifty years later,
offered yet more hope for those suffering excessive punishments. In Trop v.
Dulles, the Court spoke for the first time of “the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” the yardstick by
which the Eighth Amendment measures all criminal punishments.243 The
Court found no difficulty in ruling that the loss of citizenship faced by
Private Trop after his conviction for a one-day stint of desertion from his
Army post in French Morocco was constitutionally excessive.244 In its
analysis, the Court warned of the perverse effect the continued existence of
the death penalty may have on other punishments when it said, “the
existence of the death penalty is not a license to the Government to devise
any punishment short of death within the limit of its imagination.”245 Thus,
even though wartime deserters faced the death penalty, denationalization for
a non-wartime deserter was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual: “It is a
form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the
individual the political existence that was centuries in the development.”246
Moreover, the Court found support for its conclusion in the fact that only
two other nations in the world—Turkey and the Philippines—permitted
denationalization as a punishment for desertion.247 The Trop Court set itself
apart from later non-capital proportionality cases by considering
international law. Furthermore, by recognizing the potential for abuse in
non-capital sentencing caused by the continued existence of the death
penalty, the Court exhibited remarkable prescience.
Four years later, the Court again overturned an imprisonment as cruel
and unusual punishment, even though the sentence in Robinson v.
California was just ninety days in a county jail.248 In doing so, the Court
made the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment for

243. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
244. Id. Private Trop had escaped from a stockade, where he was being disciplined, but the next
day was walking with a companion back toward the Army base when an Army truck drove by. Trop
willingly got into the truck and went back to the base, where he was later court-martialed for desertion
and given a dishonorable discharge. Id. at 87–88.
245. Id. at 99.
246. Id. at 101.
247. Id. at 103.
248. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
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the first time.249 Robinson had been convicted under a California statute that
criminalized the status of narcotic addiction.250 The Court compared
narcotic addiction to mental illness, leprosy, and venereal disease, the
criminalization of which “would doubtless be universally thought to be an
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.”251 Narcotic addiction was no different, the Court
held, even though “imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a
punishment which is either cruel or unusual.”252 Emphasizing that the
question before the Court could not be considered in the abstract, the Court
concluded that “[e]ven one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual
punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”253 Robinson is
significant, therefore, in two respects. First, the Court explicitly recognized
that very short sentences can run afoul of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause if they are imposed for the wrong reasons. Second, the
Court implicitly recognized that the Eighth Amendment was doctrinally
grounded in the dignity of every human being. The future of non-capital
proportionality review looked bright.
By 1980, however, the promise of Trop and Robinson had dimmed
substantially. In Rummel v. Estelle, the Court upheld a mandatory life
sentence under a felony recidivist statute following the defendant’s
conviction for obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses.254 On the way to its
conclusion, the Court staked out a territory separate and apart from its
recent death penalty decisions: “Because a sentence of death differs in kind
from any sentence of imprisonment, no matter how long, our decisions
applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments to capital cases
are of limited assistance in deciding the constitutionality of the punishment
meted out to Rummel.”255 The Court held out no hope for someone who
might challenge a sentence as excessive, even a life sentence: “[o]ne could
argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that . . . the
length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative
prerogative.”256 Only the most outrageous example—mandatory life
imprisonment for overtime parking, as suggested by dissenting Justices
249. Id. (“[A] state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he
has never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there,
inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
250. Id. at 660–61 & n.1 (“No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to
the use of narcotics . . . .” (citation omitted)).
251. Id. at 666 (citing Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)).
252. Id. at 667.
253. Id.
254. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 266, 285 (1980).
255. Id. at 272.
256. Id. at 274.
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Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens 257—could convince the Court that
“a proportionality principle would . . . come into play.”258 The future of
proportionality challenges in non-capital cases looked dire indeed after
Rummel.
Two years later, the Court summarily reversed a lower court’s grant of
habeas corpus relief in Hutto v. Davis.259 Davis received a sentence of forty
years in prison and a fine of $20,000 for possession and distribution of
approximately nine ounces of marijuana.260 Holding that the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals “failed to heed our decision in Rummel,” the Court
reinstated Davis’s sentence.261 To be sure, the Court could have
distinguished Davis’s crimes from those committed by Rummel because
Davis was not sentenced under a habitual offender statute.262 But the Court
did not draw on that distinction and simply extended its holding in Rummel
to Davis.263 Justice Brennan wrote a piercing dissent:
I can only believe that the Court perceives this case as one in
which the narrow Rummel ruling concerning recidivist statutes
can be extended to new terrain without the necessary exertion of
argument and briefing. Unfortunately, it is Roger Trenton Davis
who must now suffer the pains of the Court's insensitivity, and
serve out the balance of a 40-year sentence viewed as cruel and
unusual by at least six judges below. I dissent from this patent
264
abuse of our judicial power.

But the next year, in Solem v. Helm, the Rummel dissenters gained one
Justice to become the majority.265 They rejected Rummel’s reasoning266 and
struck down Helm’s habitual offender sentence of life without parole for the
crime of uttering a “no account” check for $100,267 Helm’s seventh non-

257. Id. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.) (“A statute
that levied a mandatory life sentence for overtime parking might well deter vehicular lawlessness, but it
would offend our felt sense of justice.”).
258. Id. at 274 n.11.
259. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 , 375 (1982) (per curiam).
260. Id. at 370–71.
261. Id. at 372.
262. Id. at 371.
263. Id. at 375.
264. Id. at 388 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ.).
265. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 304 (1983). Justice Blackmun was in the majority in
Rummel, but not among the dissenters in Helm. Id.
266. Id. at 303 n.32 (explaining that because “the Rummel Court . . . offered no standards” for
deciding Eighth Amendment challenges, its ruling must be read as “controlling only in a similar factual
situation”).
267. Id. at 281–82.
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violent offense.268 The Court dismissed the State’s argument that the Eighth
Amendment’s proportionality principle does not apply to felony prison
sentences: “The constitutional language itself suggests no exception for
imprisonment. . . . It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser punishment of
a fine and the greater punishment of death were both subject to
proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of imprisonment
were not.”269 The Court then set out, for the first time in the non-capital
sentencing context, three factors to guide courts in reviewing sentences
under the Eighth Amendment.270 Like the factors considered in death
penalty cases, the proportionality factors had to be “objective.”271 The first
factor is “the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty.”272
Second, the Court said, “it may be helpful to compare the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction.”273 Finally, “courts
may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed for commission of the
same crime in other jurisdictions.”274
Applying those factors to Helm’s life without parole sentence, the
Court first found Helm’s latest crime to be “one of the most passive felonies
a person could commit.”275 The Court also found all of his prior crimes
minor and non-violent.276 Furthermore, the sentence of life without parole
was far more severe than Rummel’s life sentence (with parole) and the most
severe punishment authorized by the State of South Dakota.277 Proceeding
to the second and third factors, the Court noted only a handful of crimes,
including murder, treason, first-degree arson, and kidnapping, for which the
penalty was authorized. The Court also noted a large group of serious
crimes, including aggravated assault and a third offense of heroin dealing,
for which it was not authorized.278 Moreover, it appeared that South Dakota

268. Id. at 279–80 (noting that “alcohol was a contributing factor in each case”).
269. Id. at 288–89. “There is also no historical support for such an exception. The common-law
principle incorporated into the Eighth Amendment clearly applied to prison terms.” Id. at 289.
270. Id. at 290–92.
271. Id. at 290.
272. Id. at 290–91 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)); Coker v. Georgia 433
U.S. 584, 597–98 (1977); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 363, 365 (1910)).
273. Id. at 291 (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795; Weems, 217 U.S. at 380–81).
274. Id. (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 794–95; Coker, 433 U.S. at 593–97; Weems, 217 U.S. at
380).
275. Id. at 296 (citing State v. Helm, 287 N.W.2d 497, 501 (S.D. 1980)).
276. Id. at 296–97. The dissent rejected the majority’s characterization of Helm’s prior crimes as
“nonviolent,” calling that characterization a “fiction” and asserting that “[b]y comparison Rummel was a
relatively model citizen.” Id. at 304 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by White, Rehnquist, and
O’Connor, JJ.).
277. Id. at 297.
278. Id. at 298–99.
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had never given the maximum sentence to any other habitual offender.279
The Court reasoned that Helm had been treated as severely as more serious
criminals and that Helm could have received life without parole in only one
other state, Nevada.280 Therefore, the Court concluded that Helm’s sentence
was so disproportionate to the crime committed that it violated the Eighth
Amendment.281
What is notable about the Solem Court’s analysis of the objective
factors is that it did not distinguish between capital and non-capital cases,
citing to both as support for each factor.282 The Court did not explain why it
adopted a test different from and narrower than the test already established
by earlier death penalty precedents.283 That departure remains a mystery,
and perhaps a costly one for those serving long sentences. The Solem Court
could not have known that it would be the last to grant relief in a noncapital case for the remainder of the twentieth century and the beginning of
the twenty-first.284 By setting non-capital cases apart from capital cases for
purposes of Eighth Amendment proportionality review, the Court, perhaps
unwittingly, opened a door that would be slammed shut by Harmelin v.
Michigan a mere eight years later when a reconstituted Court struck back.285
In Harmelin, there was no majority opinion on the question of the
proportionality of a mandatory life without parole sentence for possession
of a large amount of cocaine.286 The statute was unique to Michigan,287 but
the Court did not even consider that fact. One of the Court’s five opinions,
authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, explicitly
rejected the Solem three-part test 288 and pronounced that “the Eighth
279. Id. at 299.
280. Id. (citing NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.010(2) (1981)) (noting that no one with crimes
comparable to Helm’s had actually received life without parole in Nevada).
281. Id. at 303.
282. See supra notes 277–79.
283. See supra notes 133–71 and accompanying text.
284. The one non-capital sentencing decision in which the Supreme Court has found a sentence
of life without parole disproportionate is Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), and that decision
relied on death penalty proportionality analysis, not the Solem v. Helm three-factor test. See infra notes
339–41 and accompanying text.
285. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
286. Id. at 961. A majority of the Court ruled only that the Eighth Amendment does not require
an individualized sentencing decision for any sentence other than the death penalty and that, therefore,
the mandatory nature of Harmelin’s sentence of life without parole was not constitutionally infirm. Id. at
994–95 (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). See also id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring,
joined by O’Connor and Souter, JJ.) (concurring only with Justice Scalia’s rejection of Harmelin’s
challenge to the mandatory nature of his sentencing).
287. Id. at 1026 (White, J., dissenting). Even the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, not known for
their leniency, would carry a sentence of no more than ten years. Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (1990)).
288. Id. at 965.
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Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee.”289 Justice Kennedy,
joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter, authored a second, concurring
opinion. They concluded that to get to the intrastate and interstate
comparisons contemplated by Solem, the Court first had to make the
threshold determination that the sentence was “grossly disproportionate” to
the crime.290 To those Justices, Harmelin’s sentence of life without parole
did not rise to the level of “gross disproportionality,” so no comparative
analysis was necessary.291
The Kennedy trio did not stop there, however. Instead, they narrowed
the scope of non-capital proportionality review by dictating five principles
that would “give content to the uses and limits of proportionality review.”292
Those principles are that: (1) the fixing of prison terms is within the
purview of legislatures, not courts;293 (2) the Eighth Amendment does not
require the states to adopt any particular penological theory;294 (3) marked
differences in sentencing theories and the length of prison terms are the
inevitable consequence of a federal system; 295 (4) proportionality review
should be informed by objective factors wherever possible;296 and (5) the
Eighth Amendment does not mandate strict proportionality between crimes
and their sentences.297 Although Justice Kennedy’s principles did not gain a
majority, they were not lost on the other members of the Court, who
transformed them into law in a later majority decision.298
The dissenters, in three separate opinions,299 took Justice Scalia to task
for failing to explain why the words “cruel and unusual” contain a
proportionality principle for some—those sentenced to death—but not for
others.300 In his dissenting opinion, Justice White criticized Justice Kennedy
for reducing Solem’s analysis from three factors to one.301 He stated that
Solem was “directly to the contrary, for there, the Court made clear that ‘no
289. Id.
290. Id. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
291. Id. at 1004–05. Justice Kennedy, applying the test to the case before the Court, reasoned:
“Given the serious nature of petitioner’s crime, no such comparative analysis is necessary.” Id. at 1004.
292. Id. at 998.
293. Id. at 999.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 1000.
297. Id. at 1001.
298. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23–24 (2003).
299. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.);
id. at 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Justice White only in his view that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the death penalty); id. at 1028 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Justice
Blackmun) (adding to Justice White’s dissenting opinion the view that mandatory life without parole
“shares an important characteristic of the death sentence: The offender will never regain his freedom”).
300. Id. at 1014 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.).
301. Id. at 1009.
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one factor will be dispositive in a given case.’”302 No one factor could be
dispositive because no objective assessment of the proportionality of a
sentence could be made without comparisons to other penalties and other
jurisdictions.303 Moreover, despite assertions to the contrary, evidence in the
decisions of state courts demonstrated that the Solem analysis was working
well. Only a handful of courts had declared sentences unconstitutionally
disproportionate.304 Unfortunately, the dissenters’ protests about the harm
wrought by Harmelin would fall on deaf ears.
The latest cases to test the Court’s non-capital proportionality doctrine
are a pair of challenges to California’s “three strikes” recidivist statute. In
Ewing v. California, Justice O’Connor wrote for a slim plurality,305 and in
Lockyer v. Andrade, for a slim majority,306 that rejected petitioners’ Eighth
Amendment claims because their sentences were not “grossly
disproportionate” to their crimes.307
The Ewing Court looked to Justice Kennedy’s five proportionality
principles for guidance in applying the Eighth Amendment 308 to Ewing’s
sentence of twenty-five years to life for stealing golf clubs valued at slightly
less than $1200.309 The Court deferred to the California legislature’s
prerogative to make and implement policy decisions that would further the
penological purposes of its criminal justice system.310 Thus, the Court had
to consider not only Ewing’s most recent crime in evaluating the
constitutionality of the state’s “three strikes” law but all of Ewing’s
previous crimes as well.311 Justice O’Connor said that “[a]ny other approach
302. Id. at 1019 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.) (citing Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291 n.17 (1983)).
303. Id. at 1021 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.).
304. Id. at 1015–16 & n.2 (citing Ashley v. State, 538 So. 2d 1181 (Miss. 1989); Naovarath v.
State, 779 P.2d 944 (Nev. 1989); Clowers v. State, 522 So. 2d 762 (Miss. 1988); State v. Gilham, 549
N.E.2d 555 (Ohio 1988)).
305. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003) (plurality opinion) (O’Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.); see also id. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting non-capital
proportionality principle in its entirety); id. at 32 (Thomas, J., concurring) (saying Eighth Amendment
contains no proportionality principle). Ewing was a 5-4 decision. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); id. at 35 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, JJ.).
306. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 65 (2003) (O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.). As this was a federal habeas case that required the petitioner to show
that the lower court’s action was “contrary to, or an unreasonable application of” clearly established
federal law, Justices Scalia and Thomas were able to join the other Justices to constitute a majority of
five. See also id. at 77 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.).
307. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30; Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 77 (Souter, J., dissenting).
308. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23–24.
309. Id. at 28.
310. Id. at 24–28.
311. Id. at 29 (“In weighing the gravity of Ewing’s offense, we must place on the scales not only
his current felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism.”).
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would fail to accord proper deference to the policy judgments that find
expression in the legislature’s choice of sanctions.”312 In the end, the Court
recognized that Ewing’s sentence was “a long one,” but “it reflect[ed] a
rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference.”313
Lockyer v. Andrade was decided similarly.314 Andrade received two
consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life for shoplifting videotapes
valued at approximately $150.315 Because his was a habeas corpus action,
Andrade was required to show that his sentence was “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law,”
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).316 In deciding what constitutes clearly
established federal law, the Court rejected Andrade’s argument that
Rummel, Solem, and Harmelin “clearly establish[ed]” that his sentence was
grossly disproportionate to his crime.317 The Court explained that the
“precedents in this area have not been a model of clarity.”318 Through the
“thicket of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,” the Court could discern but
one “clearly established” legal principle: “A gross disproportionality
principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years.”319 Even then, the
Court’s decisions lacked clarity regarding what constitutes gross
disproportionality.320 What was clear to the Court, however, was that the
gross disproportionality principle should be reserved for the “extraordinary
case,” and Andrade’s was not such a case.321
Thus, to succeed on a disproportionality challenge to any sentence
other than death, future petitioners must show not only that their sentences
are disproportionate to their crimes, but that they are “grossly
disproportionate.” What constitutes gross disproportionality is not clear.
The only case in which relief was granted to a non-capital petitioner, Solem
v. Helm, preceded the Court’s wholesale rejection of its earlier precedents
and its adoption of the stringent gross disproportionality test as the sole

312. Id.
313. Id. at 30.
314. The Court reached the same conclusion as in Ewing, although it was required to perform a
different analysis because Lockyer was a habeas corpus action. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 67–68
(2003).
315. Id. at 66. Andrade, having been an addict for nearly twenty years, admitted to taking the
videotapes so that he could sell them and buy heroin. Id. at 67.
316. Id. at 71.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 72.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 72–73.
321. Id. at 77. “In applying this principle for § 2254(d)(1) purposes, it was not an unreasonable
application of our clearly established law for the California Court of Appeal to affirm Andrade’s
sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison.” Id.
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measure of a non-capital penalty’s Eighth Amendment viability.322
Although the Court has never expressly overruled Solem, it is for all intents
and purposes a dead letter.323 Not one of the post-Solem cases established
with any clarity just what it will take for a majority of the Justices to find a
sentence so extraordinary as to require striking it down as a cruel and
unusual punishment.324
The deeply troubling question that remains is why we have come to
this—why non-capital proportionality review withers on the vine while
capital punishment review flourishes, as ever-increasing considerations
hold sway with the Court.325 We are left to contemplate why conducting a
nation-wide legislative tally is a permanent fixture in death penalty cases,
while no inter-jurisdictional comparisons are even contemplated unless the
non-capital petitioner can prove that he is truly extraordinary and his
sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crime. Similarly, the Court has
never explained why it will consider the direction of any legislative change
and the actual use of the statutes at issue in assessing the proportionality of
the death penalty, but not for challenges to long prison sentences. And if the
scholarly opinions of experts, the views of the international community, and
even polling numbers are all respected parts of the capital proportionality
matrix, their absence in non-capital sentencing review is difficult to fathom.
Two lines of analysis emanating from the same constitutional provision
could not be more different.
While it may be beyond reasonable dispute that “death is different,” the
Eighth Amendment does not protect capital defendants alone.326 The
322. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
323. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Is Any Sentence Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 39 TRIAL 78,
79 (2003).
By upholding the life sentences imposed on Ewing and Andrade, the Supreme
Court has made it extremely unlikely that any sentence will be deemed to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Not one justice in the majority expressed
concern, let alone outrage, that two men have been imprisoned for life for
shoplifting a small amount of merchandise.
Id.; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 125, at 186 (stating that Harmelin majority “refined . . . out of
existence” Justice Powell’s three-part Solem test and that the “new threshold requirement of gross
disproportionality has proven an insurmountable hurdle for Eighth Amendment challenges to long
prison terms”).
324. Even Graham does not help with defining the “extraordinary” case that will prove “gross
disproportionality” because Graham was not decided with those tests, but rather by analyzing juvenile
life without parole for non-homicides using the analytical framework previously reserved for death
penalty cases.
325. This is not to say that every relevant consideration should not be examined when assessing
the validity of the death penalty in a single case or in a category of cases. It is to say that nothing in the
language of the Eighth Amendment or the Court’s precedents explains why those same concerns should
not animate non-capital proportionality review.
326. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 125, at 204 (“To recognize that ‘death is different’ is also
to assert that incarceration (as opposed to death) is different, too—less severe, less final, less
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problem is that the Court’s recent non-capital precedents, with the notable
exception of Graham, make it appear that a prison term can never be cruel
and unusual no matter how long it is. For Justice Stevens, reaching this
juncture was constitutionally unthinkable. In his short concurrence in
Graham, Justice Stevens drove home the moral imperative of
proportionality review for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: “[U]nless we
are to abandon the moral commitment embodied in the Eighth Amendment,
proportionality review must never become effectively obsolete.”327
Thus, when Graham reached the Supreme Court, the Justices were
faced with a dilemma. To follow the tattered remnants of non-capital review
left by Harmelin and the three-strikes cases would limit the Court’s review
to examining Graham’s crime and sentence for gross disproportionality. On
the other hand, to employ capital punishment analysis in reviewing
Graham’s challenge would cross a divide that no other case had dared. In
the end, and no doubt influenced in large part by the legal posture of
Graham’s claim as a categorical one, the Court chose its robust death
penalty analysis over its decidedly anemic non-capital approach. That
choice was reinforced by the fact that the closest factual precedent was
Roper, and it just happened to be a death penalty case. More significant
than that distinction was the fact that both cases dealt with juvenile
offenders sentenced to the most extreme adult sentences.
With Graham, the Court furthered an evolving “kids are different”
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence that reaches all juvenile offenders serving
adult sentences. This “kids are different” jurisprudence arises from the
criminalization of adolescence—the explosion in trying juveniles as adults
that followed massive statutory incursions into the exclusive jurisdiction of
the juvenile court in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Absent that sea change
in the treatment of youth who commit crimes, we would not be where we
are today, as the following discussion shows.
IV. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ADOLESCENCE
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw an unprecedented crackdown on
teenagers committing violent crimes. During that decade, forty-five states
enacted laws that made it easier to try juveniles as adults,328 their fears

problematic, and less worthy of attention. In light of our current crisis of mass incarceration, we need to
be wary of any such implication.”).
327. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring).
328. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, OFFICE OF JUVENILE J USTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’ T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE O FFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999
NATIONAL REPORT 112 (1999), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/
toc.html.
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fanned by reports of a “bloodbath of teenage violence”329 by juvenile
“super-predators.”330 The “super-predator” scare caught fire among elected
representatives across the country.331 Fearing the worst, they shifted their
attention from laws that protect youth to laws that protect the public from
this new breed of vicious juveniles.332 The best way to achieve their public
protection goal was to make certain that juveniles who committed serious
crimes did serious time, so legislation favoring every mechanism for trying
a juvenile as an adult mushroomed.333
Public enthusiasm for treating juveniles as adults was captured in the
phrase, “[I]f you commit an adult crime, you’d better be prepared to do the
time.”334 Juvenile offenders could no longer expect to receive the treatment
329. Peter Annin, ‘Superpredators’ Arrive, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1996, at 57 (“Should we cage
the new breed of vicious kids?”); ANNE-MARIE CUSAC, CRUEL AND U NUSUAL: THE CULTURE OF
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 174 (2009) (referencing Northeastern University Professor James Allen Fox’s
1996 description of a “teenage time bomb”); Richard Zoglin, Now for the Bad News: A Teenage Time
Bomb, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 52.
330. John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27,
1995, at 23 (coining the term “super-predators” to refer to “severely morally impoverished” juvenile
“street criminals” who Dilulio claimed were responsible for the “youth crime wave”); see also WILLIAM
J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY AND H OW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST
CRIME AND DRUGS 26 (1996). “[A]s high as America’s body count is today, a rising tide of youth crime
and violence is about to lift it even higher. A new generation of street criminals is upon us—the
youngest, biggest, and baddest generation any society has ever known.” Id. But see PETER ELIKANN,
SUPERPREDATORS: THE DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN BY THE LAW 41, 75 (1999) (refuting claims
of a young super-predator wave of violence).
331. PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., OFFICE OF J UVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,
U.S. D EP’T OF J USTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 59–61 (1996)
[hereinafter STATE RESPONSES], available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/stateresp.pdf (observing that
the perception that juvenile crime was on the rise led a vast majority of states to change their laws
during the early 1990s, resulting in a more punitive juvenile justice system and greater numbers of
juveniles being tried as adults); see also MIKE A. MALES, FRAMING YOUTH: TEN MYTHS ABOUT THE
NEXT GENERATION 32 (1999) (commenting on media’s mischaracterization of youth violence during the
1990s as “soaring” when it was actually decreasing); J. Robert Flores, Foreword to HOWARD N.
SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. D EP’T OF JUSTICE, J UVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006
ANNUAL REPORT, at iii (2006), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR
2006.pdf (reporting that the rate of juvenile violent crime arrests has decreased steadily since 1994,
falling to a level “not seen since at least the 1970s”); Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion and Youth
Justice, 31 CRIME & JUST. 495, 499–503 (2004) (reporting that the volume of crimes committed by
juveniles was overestimated).
332. See, e.g., Andrew K. Block, A Look Back and a Look Forward: Legislative and Regulatory
Highlights for 2008 and 2009 and a Discussion of Juvenile Transfer, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 53, 73–75
(2009); Sara Glazer, Lawmakers Pressured to Give Adult Terms to Juvenile Offenders: Perception That
Youth Crime Is Becoming More Violent Borne Out in Statistics, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 13,
1994, at 6A (“[L]awmakers across the country are scrambling to respond to polls indicating that
Americans see juvenile punishments as too short and too soft.”).
333. See STATE RESPONSES, supra note 331, at 59–61.
334. Elizabeth S. Scott, Keynote Address at Temple University James E. Beasley School of
Law, Law and Adolescence Symposium: Adolescence and the Regulation of Youth Crime (Mar. 18,
2006), in 79 TEMPLE L. REV. 337, 351 n.54 (2006).
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designed for them in the juvenile courts, but increasingly faced the harshest
of penalties in courts designed for, and largely populated by, adult
offenders. Once in adult court, juveniles faced mandatory minimum
sentences 335 that were unheard of in the juvenile system.336 The fact that the
“super-predator” uproar turned out to be a myth337 was lost on policymakers
and prosecutors. In fact, violent juvenile crime had decreased even before
the “super-predator” scare hit the pages of the newspapers, and nothing
suggested that the declining crime rates were brought about by the harsher
laws enacted in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s.338 Every year since
1994, violent juvenile crime has decreased, and by 2006, it was at levels
last seen in the 1970s.339 In response to statistics showing the steady decline
in youth crime, the person who had warned of a teenage “blood bath” said
he never meant that such an atrocity would come to pass, but only that he
wanted to get people’s attention.340 But the harm was already done.341 Once
the appetite for getting juveniles into adult courts and adult prisons was
whetted by statutes making adult prosecution of juveniles easier, there was
no going back.342 For juveniles, trial in adult criminal court penalized them
335. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 328, at 108.
336. The juvenile justice system has always operated as an indeterminate sentencing system.
Delores E. Craig-Moreland & Katherine Haliburton, Impact of a Juvenile Correctional Facilities
Sentencing Matrix, 4 J. INST. J USTICE & I NT’L STUDIES 73, 73 (2004).
337. ELIKANN, supra note 330, at 41–42 (debunking the popular notion that we must live in fear
of our children); OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. D EP’T OF J USTICE,
OJJDP RESEARCH 2000, at 3 (2001), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/report_research_
2000/findings.html (“No evidence of a new and more serious ‘breed’ of child delinquent and young
murderer exists.”); Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young “Super-Predators,” Bush Aide Has
Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A19 (reporting that Dilulio later expressed regret for his careless
use of hyperbole and acknowledged that his prediction had not come to pass).
338. See Flores, supra note 331, at iii (reporting a steady decline in juvenile violent crime arrests
since 1994, down to levels in the 1970s).
339. Id.; ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE J USTICE 181
(2008) [hereinafter RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE].
340. CUSAC , supra note 329, at 175 (quoting Vincent Schiraldi & Mark Kappelhoff, Where
Have the Superpredators Gone?, SALON.COM (May 13, 1997), http://www.salon.com/may97/news/
news970513.html).
341. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 339, at 109–12 (describing episodes of “moral panic”
in which public fears generate political responses with punitive policies which impact becomes
institutionalized through legislative reform and continues to determine how the justice system deals with
youth long after the panic has subsided); see also ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL
PANICS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE 205 (1994) (chronicling various eras of moral panic
across the globe, including the drug panic in the United States during the 1980s).
342. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 339, at 10–11, 109–12 (noting that the “moral panic”
that swept juveniles into adult court in escalating numbers had an enduring impact because “once the
legislative reform process is initiated, it seems to take on a life of its own”); see also MICHAEL TONRY,
THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 5 (2004).
Moral panics . . . typically occur when horrifying or notorious events galvanize
public emotion, and produce concern, sympathy, emotion, and overreaction.
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twice for society’s increased appetite for more punitive measures—first,
when they were subjected to the fervor for transferring them out of the
jurisdiction of juvenile court, and second, when they were punished under
the more punitive measures demanded by the public in response to the War
on Drugs.343
This certainly was not what the creators of the juvenile court had in
mind when they established a separate court system that would recognize
that children are different from adults and that their transgressions should
be handled differently from those of adults. Although the concept of
juvenile delinquency dates as far back as the seventeenth century,344 it was
not until 1899 that the first juvenile court was founded in Chicago.345 When
the Chicago Juvenile Court came into being, it was viewed as part social
work and part law, with the goal of rehabilitating those who came before
the court.346 Its inventors “used the doctrine of parens patriae to argue that
benevolent state treatment of children was in their best interest.”347 Those
early reformers found motivation in the objective of protecting young
people from the punitive and destructive features of the criminal justice
system.348 Common to all of the juvenile court systems across the country
was a commitment to assuring the social welfare of the child; instead of
punishment, children received rehabilitation and treatment from a
Examples in recent years include the kidnapping of Polly Klaas in California and
the crack-overdose death of Len Bias in Maryland. Results included, respectively,
California’s three-strikes law and the federal 100-to-1 crack cocaine sentencing
law.
Id.
343. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 125, at 167.
344. Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts,
54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 582 (2002) (commenting that juvenile delinquency “arose in the wake of economic
and political conditions endemic to nascent capitalist societies” in Europe (quoting ANTHONY M. PLATT,
THE CHILD SAVERS: THE I NVENTION OF D ELINQUENCY, at xviii (2d ed. 1977))).
345. The Cook County Juvenile Court was the first juvenile court in the country. It was a
creature of statute created by an act of the Illinois legislature entitled “An Act to Regulate the Treatment
and Control of Dependent, Neglected and Delinquent Children,” 1899 ILL. LAWS 131. See David S.
Tanenhaus, Policing the Child: Juvenile Justice in Chicago, 1870–1925 (1997) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, The University of Chicago) (on file with Boyd Law Library, The University of Chicago)
(comprehensive treatment of the origins of the Chicago juvenile court system).
346. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 804–05
(2003) (describing delinquents as “wayward but innocent” and in need of the court’s firm guidance and
rehabilitation); David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution of Transfer out of the Juvenile Court, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO CRIMINAL COURT 13, 18
(Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (juvenile court was concerned with the social welfare
of children, not the assignment of criminal responsibility).
347. Tanenhaus, supra note 345, at 18.
348. Franklin E. Zimring, The Common Thread: Diversion in Juvenile Practice, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 2477, 2482 (2000). See PLATT, supra note 344, at 137–45 (describing the early development of
juvenile courts as “medical-therapeutic”).
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benevolent court whose mission was to serve the complete child in a
“judicial-welfare alternative to criminal justice.”349 By 1925, all but two
states had enacted statutes to establish juvenile courts with exclusive
original jurisdiction over everyone under the age of eighteen charged with a
crime.350
Only if the juvenile court waived its jurisdiction could a juvenile be
transferred to criminal court for trial as an adult.351 Juvenile court transfer
decisions employed individualized determinations that were made on a
case-by-case basis using a “best interests of the child” standard.352 But as
public sentiment and fears of violent teenage criminals captured the
attention of elected representatives, two additional avenues for trial of youth
as adults gained traction: legislative exclusion and prosecutorial waiver or
“direct file.”353 Today, every jurisdiction employs one or more of the three
statutory mechanisms for prosecuting juveniles as adults.354 Each category

349. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court – Part II: Race and the “Crack
Down” on Youth Crime, 84 MINN. L. REV. 327, 337 (1999). See generally WILLIAM A YERS, A KIND
AND JUST PARENT: T HE C HILDREN OF J UVENILE C OURT (1997).
350. See Tanenhaus, supra note 345, at 6 (stating that Maine and Wyoming came along later).
Over the years, the rehabilitative ideal of the juvenile court suffered setbacks and eventually collapsed.
See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 346, at 804–05 (explaining the effects of the collapse of the
rehabilitative model of juvenile justice). The Supreme Court soon acknowledged that a youthful
offender called into juvenile court often receives “the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the
[constitutional] protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children.” Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). Critics of the absence of
procedural protections and the sweeping custodial powers of juvenile court judges, see, e.g., Roscoe
Pound, Foreword in PAULINE V. YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND D ELINQUENCY, at
xxvii (1937); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN
THE NEW REPUBLIC 268 (1st ed. 1971), charted the course that would lead to the recognition of
juveniles’ due process rights, including the right to counsel, notice of charges, confrontation and crossexamination, and the privilege against self-incrimination. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)
(recognizing that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for Adults alone”). The
procedural rights afforded juveniles for the first time made juvenile court more like adult criminal court
but retained protections for the young through the juvenile court’s retention of its “best interests of the
child” orientation. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 329, at 94.
351. Tanenhaus, supra note 345, at 21. The term “transfer” is synonymous with “waiver” in the
context of juvenile court vis-à-vis criminal court jurisdiction. A child under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the juvenile court because she is under the age of eighteen may be “transferred” to adult criminal court
under certain circumstances and for certain offenses. In the same instance, the juvenile court “waives”
its exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, and so it is a “waiver” decision as well.
352. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 328, at 94.
353. Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A
History and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS
TO CRIMINAL COURT 83, 84–85 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
354. Id.; see also Tanenhaus, supra note 345, at 21. In 1910, thirty-two states’ juvenile laws set
explicit age limits, with only one setting the upper age at nineteen and three setting the upper age at
eighteen; the others set their upper age limits at sixteen or seventeen. Id. In addition, certain felonies
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contributes in its own way to the criminalization of adolescence because
each is a mechanism for removing an adolescent from the protection of the
juvenile court to face prosecution, conviction, and sentencing in the
criminal justice system. However, judicial waiver is qualitatively different
from either legislative exclusion or prosecutorial waiver.
Judicial waiver, the most common of the three approaches, was the
subject of the inaugural juvenile justice case to reach the United States
Supreme Court, Kent v. United States.355 Sixteen-year-old Morris Kent
challenged a District of Columbia juvenile court judge’s decision to waive
juvenile court jurisdiction over him and transfer him to adult criminal court
for prosecution and sentencing.356 Kent had been charged with multiple
counts of housebreaking, robbery, and rape.357 The juvenile court judge—
without a hearing, without ruling on defense counsel’s motions to retain
juvenile court jurisdiction and commit Kent to a psychiatric facility for
treatment, without conferring with Kent or his parents, and without making
findings or providing reasons—transferred Kent for trial in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. 358
On petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Kent
fared much better than he had in the lower courts. While agreeing with the
Court of Appeals that the District of Columbia transfer statute permits the
juvenile court “considerable latitude” in determining whether to retain or
waive jurisdiction over a child charged with a criminal offense, the Court
recognized limits on the court’s discretion: “But this latitude is not
complete. At the outset, it assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the
particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process
and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory requirement of a ‘full
investigation.’”359 The Court made clear its intention to provide guidance to
were excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction in some states, and almost every state had transfer
mechanisms. Id.
355. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
356. Id. at 552–53. Although the case did not establish a constitutional right to the procedures it
laid out, it made clear that any waiver or transfer statute that did not comport with the basics of due
process and fairness would not pass constitutional muster. Id. at 557; see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22
(1967) (stating that “the features of the juvenile system which its proponents have asserted are of unique
benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication”). The Court ruled that due process is not
for adults alone and required that juvenile courts provide for right to counsel, notice of charges, and
right to confrontation and cross-examination and that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination applies to juveniles as well as adults. Id.
357. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543–44. During police interrogation, Kent volunteered information about
his involvement in multiple crimes. Id. at 544.
358. Id. at 545–46. At trial, Kent was found not guilty by reason of insanity on the rape charges,
but was convicted on the six other charges and received a sentence of five to fifteen years for each, or a
total of thirty to ninety years. Id. at 550. Because of the insanity ruling, Kent was sent to St. Elizabeth’s
Hospital. Id.
359. Id. at 553. The Court continued:
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future courts and policymakers by attaching an appendix of “determinative
factors.”360 Thus, trial of juveniles as adults was not to be treated lightly and
had to meet statutory or other provisions which themselves comported with
due process and fairness. So it is today that most states’ judicial waiver
provisions trace their origins to the Kent factors.361
On the heels of Kent and in reaction to increasing juvenile crime rates
in the 1970s, legislatures nationwide began to pass “mandatory transfer
laws that transformed children who committed serious offenses into
automatic adults.”362 “Mandatory transfer” or “mandatory waiver” laws
substitute a conditional legislative exclusion for the judicial discretion of
ordinary waiver provisions.363 Mandatory waiver provisions exclude certain
offenses for certain ages of children with certain juvenile histories from
[The statute] does not confer upon the Juvenile Court a license for arbitrary
procedure. The statute does not permit the Juvenile Court to determine in isolation
and without the participation or any representation of the child the ‘critically
important’ question whether a child will be deprived of the special protections and
provisions of the Juvenile Court Act. It does not authorize the Juvenile Court, in
total disregard of a motion for hearing filed by counsel, and without any hearing
or statement of reasons, to decide—as in this case—that the child will be taken
from the Receiving Home for Children and transferred to jail along with adults,
and that he will be exposed to the possibility of a death sentence instead of
treatment for a maximum, in Kent's case, of five years, until he is 21.
Id. at 553–54 (footnotes and citations omitted).
360. Id. at 565–67. The “determinative factors” came from a policy memorandum prepared in
1959 by the Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court:
1.
The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the
protection of the community requires waiver.
2.
Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner.
3.
Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property,
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal
injury resulted.
4.
The prosecutive merit of the complaint . . . .
5.
The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court
when the juvenile’s associates in the alleged offense are adults . . . .
6.
The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern
of living.
7.
The record and previous history of the juvenile. . . .
8.
The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to have committed the
alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently
available to the Juvenile Court.
Id. at 565–66.
361. Robert O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE J USTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL C OURT 45, 52 (Jeffrey Fagan &
Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000).
362. Tanenhaus, supra note 345, at 33.
363. Dawson, supra note 361, at 65.
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juvenile court jurisdiction; the exclusion is conditional because it is
available only if the prosecutor requests it through filing a petition or
motion and only if the juvenile court judge finds that the case
characteristics match the statutory elements for exclusion.364 These hybrid
provisions signaled what would become a full-frontal onslaught on judicial
waiver by a wave of statutory provisions vesting all authority for juvenile
prosecution in the hands of the legislature or a prosecutor rather than the
judge.
After judicial waiver, the most common species of statute leading to
the trial of a juvenile as an adult is legislative or statutory exclusion.365 This
approach removes certain juveniles charged with certain offenses from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.366 It focuses on the seriousness of the
offense and, at times, the age of the offender, forswearing the rehabilitative
ideal of the juvenile courts by opting instead for the retributive criminal
justice rationale.367 A juvenile charged with an excluded offense is tried as
an adult automatically without any hearing in either juvenile or criminal
court.368 A form of statutory exclusion that has a dramatic effect on the
numbers of juveniles tried as adults is legislation that lowers the upper age
limit for juvenile court jurisdiction from seventeen to sixteen or even
fifteen.369 Thirteen states now set the upper age for juvenile court
jurisdiction at fifteen or sixteen.370 Every year, those states try as many as
200,000 juveniles as adults because of their lower age limits for juvenile
court jurisdiction,371 nearly four times the number tried through all other
transfer and exclusion mechanisms combined.372
364. Id.
365. See Feld, supra note 353, at 91 (“Legislative offense exclusion . . . provides the primary
conceptual alternative to judicial waiver.”).
366. Feld, supra note 353, at 91; SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 339, at 97 (discussing the
distrust of juvenile court judges reflected in reforms giving criminal courts automatic jurisdiction).
367. Feld, supra note 353, at 84–85.
368. See id. (noting that legislatures are free to limit the jurisdiction of juvenile courts).
369. Between 1992 and 1995, eleven states lowered the age of transfer. See TORBET ET AL.,
supra note 332, at 4 (1996); see also Tamar R. Birckhead, North Carolina, Juvenile Jurisdiction, and the
Resistance to Reform, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1443 (2008) (criticizing North Carolina laws that lowered the
upper limit of juvenile court jurisdiction to fifteen and then provided no mechanism for seeking return to
juvenile court and chronicling the human cost and consequences of prosecuting 26,000 sixteen- and
seventeen-year-olds in the North Carolina adult criminal courts each year).
370. NAT’ L COUNCIL ON CRIME & D ELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL
TREATMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 5 (2007), available at http://www.nccdcrc.org/nccd/pubs/2007jan_justice_for_some.pdf (reporting that thirteen states automatically try
juveniles ages sixteen and seventeen as adults); see also SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 328, at 114
(same).
371. NAT’ L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, supra note 370, at 5 (reporting that more than
200,000 juveniles are tried annually because of lower age limits on juvenile court jurisdiction); see also
CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH J USTICE, N ATIONAL STATISTICS (2010), available at http://www.campaignfor
youthjustice.org/national-statistics.html (reporting that 200,000 juveniles are tried, sentenced, or
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Statutory exclusions have been roundly criticized for mandating adult
prosecution purely on the basis of the offense charged (or the offender’s
age) rather than on any consideration of the offender’s individual
characteristics.373 Excluded juveniles have challenged their “automatic
adulthood” under these statutes as a denial of due process because they
receive neither the safeguards nor the judicial review provided by Kent.374
Their arguments have failed.375 Even though the consequences of statutory
exclusion are comparable to the consequences of waiver, the same
procedural safeguards do not apply.376 For that reason, it is as unfortunate as
it is clear that statutory exclusions are here to stay.
The third and final mechanism for converting juveniles to adult
criminal defendants is known as prosecutorial waiver or “direct file”
legislation.377 These laws give the prosecutor the unfettered power to
choose whether to file charges in juvenile or criminal court without having
to justify that choice in a judicial hearing.378 In the absence of invidious
incarcerated as adults every year); CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, THE CONSEQUENCES AREN’ T
MINOR: THE IMPACT OF TRYING YOUTH AS ADULTS AND STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 6 (2007), available
at http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJNR_ConsequencesMinor.pdf (reporting
that in states in which juvenile court jurisdiction ends at fifteen or sixteen years of age, the vast majority
of youth those ages are prosecuted in adult criminal court for non-violent crimes); SNYDER &
SICKMUND, supra note 328, at 110–16.
372. AMNESTY INT’L & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT
PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE U NITED STATES 17 n.30 (2005), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/10/11/rest-their-lives (estimating that states tried 55,000 transferred
juveniles as adults in 2000); SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 328, at 112–14 (outlining methods of
transferring juveniles to adult court).
373. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Social and Legal Policy Dimensions of Violent Juvenile Crime, 17
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 93 (1990); Eric K. Klein, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the
Role of Transfer to Criminal Court on Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371 (1998); Wallace J.
Mylniec, Juvenile Delinquent or Adult Convict—The Prosecutor’s Choice, 14 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29,
30–33, 44–51 (1976) (arguing that both mandatory waivers and statutory exclusions essentially give the
prosecutor control over the forum in which a juvenile will be tried, and that in order to preserve the
protections provided by the juvenile justice system, legislatures should include procedural safeguards in
these statutes requiring prosecutors to consider the individual characteristics of the juvenile when
deciding in which forum to charge a case); Franklin E. Zimring, The Treatment of Hard Cases in
American Juvenile Justice: In Defense of Discretionary Waiver, 5 N OTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 267 (1991).
374. Feld, supra note 353, at 91.
375. See United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909
(1973) (rejecting Bland’s procedural due process argument and holding that principles of separation of
powers bar it from intervening in exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
376. See Bland, 472 F.2d at 1341 (Skelly Wright, J., dissenting) (arguing that statutory
exclusion was a “blatant attempt to evade the force of the Kent decision” and that the same procedural
protections should apply).
377. Feld, supra note 353, at 85; Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Transfer of Juveniles
to Criminal Court: A Case Study and Analysis of Prosecutorial Waiver, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 281, 284 (1991).
378. See Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 909
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discrimination,379 judges generally will decline to review prosecutorial
charging decisions because the separation of powers doctrine bars the
judicial branch from passing judgment on the exercise of what are
essentially discretionary functions by the executive branch, of which
prosecutors are a part.380 As a result, challenges to the exercise of direct file
authority, like challenges to statutory exclusions, generally have been
unsuccessful.381
In all, forty-five states and the District of Columbia have judicial
waiver provisions.382 Twenty-nine states have enacted certain statutory
exclusions that allow for trial of juveniles automatically in adult criminal
court.383 Fifteen states have prosecutorial waiver or “direct file”
provisions.384 With these laws has come a dramatic increase in the number
of youth tried in adult criminal court and incarcerated in adult prisons.385
Although studies consistently report lower admissions to adult prison in
recent years, due in part to a decrease in juvenile crime since the mid1990s,386 the number of juveniles tried and sentenced as adults remains
high.387
(1973) (rejecting any requirement of procedural safeguards as a precondition to a prosecutor’s exercise
of discretion to try a juvenile as adult); see also Bishop & Frazier, supra note 377, at 285 (describing the
discretion that prosecutorial waiver statutes give to prosecutors); Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious
Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction,
38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 629 (1994).
379. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (holding that the Attorney
General and U.S. Attorneys had broad discretion as to whom to prosecute and that petitioners’ selective
prosecution claim asked a federal court to do what it would not—invade the province of the executive);
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (holding that the federal government had broad
discretion as to whether to prosecute the petitioner, a vocal Vietnam War critic who had failed to register
with the Selective Service).
380. Feld, supra note 353, at 93.
381. See, e.g., Flakes v. People, 153 P.3d 427, 438 (Colo. 2007) (holding that a “direct file”
statute did not violate the separation of powers doctrine and stating that prosecutorial discretion is not
unconstitutional); Manduley v. Superior Court, 41 P.3d 3, 16 (Cal. 2002) (holding that a prosecutor has
discretion to file certain charges against a juvenile directly in criminal court and that a prosecutor does
not usurp any judicial function in exercising such discretion, even though in other situations a juvenile
court is authorized to decide whether a juvenile is fit for disposition in juvenile court). But see State v.
Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1006 (Utah 1995) (holding that the “direct file” provision violated juveniles’ rights
under the state constitution to the uniform operation of the general laws of the state).
382. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 328, at 112.
383. Id. at 110, 113.
384. Id.
385. See JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., J UVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL
ASSESSMENT, at iii (2000).
386. Juvenile Arrests 2008, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, (Office of Juvenile Justice &
Delinquency Prevention, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2009, at 1, available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/ojjdp/228479.pdf (reporting that juvenile crime continued to decrease in 2008 and that 2008
arrest rates for violent crimes were substantially lower than the peak year of 1994); see also Juvenile
Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, (Office of
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At bottom, the problem for anyone adversely affected by judicial
waiver, legislative exclusion, or prosecutorial “direct file” is that there is no
right to be treated as a juvenile delinquent rather than as an adult criminal.
Juvenile courts, and the jurisdiction they exercise, are creatures of statute,
and what the legislature gives, the legislature may take away.388 Thus,
nothing can prevent the trial of a juvenile as an adult if the prosecution so
chooses or the juvenile court judge waives her exclusive jurisdiction over a
given case. What can minimize the negative effects of adult prosecution on
one of tender years is a concerted effort to educate the judiciary about the
limitations of branding a child as an adult for criminal prosecution. Being
tried in criminal court does not automatically make an adult out of a child;
it merely changes the court where the proceedings will play out.
Justice Kennedy recognized that simple truth in both Roper and
Graham. Tried as adults and sentenced to the two harshest penalties our
criminal justice system knows—death and life without parole
respectively—Christopher Simmons and Terrance Graham got a reprieve
from the Supreme Court, not because the statutes pursuant to which they
were tried as adults were hopelessly broken, but because they were still kids
at the time of their crimes and were therefore less culpable than they would
have been as adults. The three differences Justice Kennedy highlighted that
set juveniles apart from adults389 find strong support in the literature of
child and developmental psychology, and it is that body of knowledge that
should guide future courts.
V. AN ENLIGHTENED “KIDS ARE DIFFERENT” EIGHTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
Graham’s categorical ruling should not be seen as the endgame for
juvenile sentencing. Instead, what the Court did should be viewed for what
Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Washington, D.C.), June 2010, at 1 [hereinafter Juvenile
Transfer Laws], available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/220595.pdf (concluding that transfer
laws have little or no general deterrent effect in preventing serious juvenile crime).
387. As of June 30, 2009, by one report a total of 15,500 youth under the age of eighteen and
68,200 who were eighteen or nineteen were incarcerated in adult prisons. HEATHER C. WEST, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS , U.S. D EP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON I NMATES AT MIDYEAR 2009—STATISTICAL
TABLES 20 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim09st.pdf. The dataset does
not include a category for those younger than eighteen. However, it reports that the total includes
persons under eighteen. Thus, the 15,500 number for those under eighteen is a calculation based on the
totals reported for each age group beginning with eighteen to nineteen and ending with sixty-five or
older, subtracted from the overall total reported in the table, the remainder comprising the undereighteen group. See id.
388. Feld, supra note 353, at 91.
389. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2018 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–
71 (2005).
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it is—a ruling that directly affects a very small cohort of juvenile offenders
in adult prison and that leaves undisturbed thousands of other adult
sentences being served by offenders who were minors at the time of their
crimes, including over 2,000 sentenced to life without parole for
homicide.390 Those whose sentences Graham left intact should look to
capitalize on the Court’s reasoning and pursue categorical rulings across the
sentencing spectrum because all adult sentences are by their nature
disproportionate when visited upon juveniles. We know this because the
Court said as much and because the Court relied on credible sources.391
We begin, as the Court so often has done, with an examination of the
“objective indicia” of society’s “evolving standards of decency.”392 At first
blush, a review of legislative enactments would seem to support current
sentencing practices because all states have some form of transfer or
statutory exclusion that permits or mandates trial of certain juveniles as
adults.393 But, as the Court has recognized in its death penalty precedents, it
is not always the sheer number of statutes permitting a practice that
governs.394 The 1990s’ rewriting of juvenile transfer and legislative
exclusion provisions may have increased the number of juveniles being
tried as adults, but it said nothing about juvenile sentencing.395 Instead, the
measures enacted during that flurry of legislative activity simply affect the
390. See Frontline: When Kids Get Life (PBS television broadcast May 21, 2009), available at
http://www.pbs.org/mgbh/pages/frontline/whenkidsgetlife/ (reporting 2,574 juvenile life without parole
sentences, including those for non-homicides); see also Michael E. Tigar, What Are We Doing to the
Children? An Essay on Juvenile (In)justice, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 849, 851 (2010) (stating that more
than 2,200 juvenile offenders are serving life without parole for homicides).
391. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569); Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70
(citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, I DENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968)); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S.
Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility,
and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1013 (2003).
392. See supra notes 243–305 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 345–69 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 214–36 and accompanying text.
395. See Juvenile Transfer Laws, supra note 386, at 1; see generally CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY,
NAT’ L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, FACT SHEET: YOUTH UNDER A GE 18 IN THE A DULT
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2006), available at http://nccd-crc.issuelab.org/sd_clicks/download2/
nccd_fact_sheet_youth_under_age_18_in_the_adult_criminal_justice_system
(noting
that
most
decisions to charge juveniles in the criminal justice system come from prosecutors and state legislatures,
that there has been a 208% increase in the number of youth under eighteen serving time in adult jails on
any given day between 1990 and 2004 but that the number of new youth admissions to the adult prison
system has dropped since 1996); ASHLEY NELLIS & RYAN S. K ING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, N O
EXIT: THE EXPANDING USE OF LIFE SENTENCES IN AMERICA (2009), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_noexitseptember2009.pdf; SNYDER
& SICKMUND, supra note 328, at 96 (noting that in the 1990s, state legislatures sought to crack down on
juvenile crime by passing laws making it easier to transfer juvenile offenders from the juvenile justice
system to the criminal justice system and that between 1985 and 1994, the number of delinquency cases
waived to criminal courts rose 83% but has since declined to 1985 levels).
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jurisdiction of the juvenile court and either permit or require the juvenile
court to relinquish its exclusive jurisdiction over certain juveniles so that
they may be tried in adult criminal court.396
As the Court said in Thompson, juvenile transfer laws show “that the
States consider 15-year-olds to be old enough to be tried in criminal court
for serious crimes (or too old to be dealt with effectively in juvenile court),
but tell[] us nothing about the judgment these States have made regarding
the appropriate punishment for such youthful offenders.”397 Similarly,
Graham recognized that many states had “chosen to move away from
juvenile court systems and to allow juveniles to be transferred to, or
charged directly in, adult court under certain circumstances”398 and to face
the same sentences as adult offenders.399 The Court made clear, however,
the limits of those laws: “But the fact that transfer and direct charging laws
make life without parole possible for some juvenile nonhomicide offenders
does not justify a judgment that many States intended to subject such
offenders to life without parole sentences.”400
Thus, while the statutes may inform observations about those who are
being taken out of juvenile court and tried as adults, any suggestion that
they say anything about the appropriate sentences for those young persons
would be baseless. In this instance, then, the otherwise “objective” indicia
of a national consensus are of no assistance; indeed, they must be
disregarded. Courts must look to other sources, as the Graham Court did, to
determine whether adult sentences are proportionate when inflicted on those
who were not adults when they committed the crimes for which they are
being sentenced.
In the exercise of its independent judgment, Graham quoted liberally
from Roper to explain the Court’s conclusion that juveniles have lesser
culpability for the offenses they commit than do adults and therefore do not
deserve to be punished as severely as adults.401 The Court focused on three

396. See supra notes 328–89 and accompanying text.
397. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826 n.24 (1988); see also id. at 850 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
When a legislature provides for some 15-year-olds to be processed through the
adult criminal justice system, and capital punishment is available for adults in that
jurisdiction, the death penalty becomes at least theoretically applicable to such
defendants. . . . however, it does not necessarily follow that the legislatures in
those jurisdictions have deliberately concluded that it would be appropriate to
impose capital punishment on 15-year-olds.
Id.
398. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2025 (2010).
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 2026–27 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005)).
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differences that set juveniles apart from adults.402 First, compared to adults,
juveniles lack maturity and have an “underdeveloped sense of
responsibility.”403 Second, juveniles are “more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”404
Third, juveniles have characters that are “not as well formed” as those of
adults.405 Graham found no reason to reconsider Roper’s conclusions and
observed that developments in brain science406 and psychology continue to
reflect those fundamental differences between juveniles and adults.407 So
too, the inherent transience of youth sets those in their teenage years apart
from adults and is itself the explanation for juveniles’ greater capacity for
change.408 Thus, Graham found continued validity in Roper’s conclusion
that “[f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings
of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a
minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”409

402. Id. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).
403. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).
404. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
405. Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
406. Graham referred to brain science in passing, while Roper referred to it not at all. Graham
observed only that “parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late
adolescence.” Id. (citing Brief for American Medical Association et al. as Amici Curiae at 16–24,
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412, 08-7621); Brief for American Psychological
Association, et al. as Amici Curiae at 22–27, Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (Nos. 08-7412,
08-7621)). In the view of at least one commentator, the Court got it right:
[T]he behavioral science was crucial to proper resolution of the case [Roper] and
furnished completely adequate resources to decide the issue. The neuroscience
was largely irrelevant. . . . Roper properly disregarded the neuroscience evidence
and thus did not provide unwarranted legitimation for the use of such evidence to
decide culpability questions generally.
Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM . L. 397, 410 (2006); see also Bruce Bower, Teen Brains on Trial: The Science of Neural
Development Tangles with the Juvenile Death Penalty, 165 SCI. NEWS 299, 299–301 (2004) (reporting
on lack of consensus within the scientific community about brain-imaging studies and legal policy, with
David Fassler and Rubin Gur on the side of believing that the science is strong enough, and Ronald Dahl
and Elizabeth Sowell believing that the evidence is not yet solid enough to be introduced into the legal
system); Nitin Gogtay et al., Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood
Through Early Adulthood, 101 PROC. NAT’L A CAD. SCI . 8174, 8177 (2004) (asserting that adolescent
behavioral immaturity mirrors the anatomical immaturity of their brains); Terry A. Maroney, The False
Promise of Adolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89 (2009)
(cautioning against overuse of developmental neuroscience based on analysis of cases in which attempts
to put the neuroscience into practice almost universally failed); Elizabeth Sowell et al., Development of
Cortical and Subcortical Brain Structures in Childhood and Adolescence: A Structural MRI Study, 44
DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD N EUROLOGY 4, 13–15 (2002) (demonstrating that MRI studies show
how a particular brain operates over time, but no more).
407. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 2026–27 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).

52

Vermont Law Review

[Vol. 36:001

The behavioral science support for Graham’s conclusions concerning
the lessened culpability of youth is incontrovertible.410 The “gold standard”
in developmental psychology and its legal implications is the collaboration
of law professor Elizabeth Scott and developmental psychologist Laurence
Steinberg.411 In their most recent work, Rethinking Juvenile Justice, Scott
and Steinberg make the case that adolescent offenders are different from
adult offenders in ways that bear on their culpability412 and then tie their
developmental case for reduced adolescent culpability to the criminal law
doctrine of mitigation.413
Scott and Steinberg’s work establishes what Graham identified as the
first distinguishing feature of adolescence—immaturity and “an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”414 While adolescents’ basic
cognitive capacity—the ability to employ logical reasoning—equals that of
adults by mid-adolescence, their psychosocial and identity development
continue well into young adulthood.415 It is the psychosocial aspects of
development that make juveniles less able to control their impulses and
more attracted to risky behaviors,416 both of which feature prominently in
criminal offending.417 Certain critical life skills set even older adolescents
apart from adults. Decision-making, for example, is a learned skill that
adults, by virtue of their greater experience in life, manage better than
adolescents.418 Teenagers do not think ahead419 and are prone to making
410. See infra notes 414–53 and accompanying text.
411. Emily Buss, Rethinking the Connection Between Developmental Science and Juvenile
Justice, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 493 (2009) (reviewing RETHINKING J UVENILE JUSTICE, supra note
339). Scott and Steinberg served on the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent
Development and Juvenile Justice from 1995 to 2006 and participated in a large-scale study of juvenile
defendants’ trial competence, whose results were reported in Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’
Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants,
27 LAW & HUM . BEHAV. 333 (2003); see also Scott, supra note 334; Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal
Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547 (2000); Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso,
The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 137 (1997); Steinberg & Scott, supra note 391, at 1009; Laurence Steinberg &
Elizabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective on Serious Juvenile Crime: When Should Juveniles
Be Treated As Adults?, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1999, at 52, 52.
412. RETHINKING J UVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 29 (“[S]cientific knowledge about
cognitive, psychosocial, and neurobiological development in adolescence supports the conclusion that
juveniles are different from adults in fundamental ways that bear on decisions about their appropriate
treatment within the justice system.”).
413. Id. at 133–39.
414. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026.
415. RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 36, 131.
416. Id. at 40–44; see also Buss, supra note 411, at 495.
417. RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 13–15.
418. Elizabeth S. Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: Lessons from Developmental
Psychology, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A D EVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE J USTICE 294 (Thomas
Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
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decisions based on a preference for immediate or short-term results over
long-term consequences.420 Even if adolescents could plan and anticipate
future events in the abstract, that capability does not necessarily translate
into competence in making real world choices “on the street” when friends
are getting ready to hold up a Stop & Shop.421 Teenagers’ tendency to live
in the moment leads them to discount risks that would be given great weight
by adults, especially when they are under emotional stress or when there is
no obvious solution to a problem.422
Similarly, limited impulse control, a normative feature of adolescence,
impairs decision-making and interferes with adolescents’ ability to act on
their choices.423 Thus, adolescents’ crimes are more often than not
impulsive and unplanned.424 Even crimes that may appear to the casual
observer to be calculated acts of revenge are often impulsive and moralistic
in origin when committed by adolescents.425 In one study, not a single
juvenile involved in a shooting could remember deciding to shoot and then
pulling the trigger; instead, they all said the gun just “went off.”426 What
those adolescents experienced is a dramatic illustration of their
psychosocial immaturity, or, as Justice Kennedy put it, their
“underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”427

419. RETHINKING J UVENILE J USTICE, supra note 339, at 30 (noting that adolescents tend to
consider the future consequences of their choices and behavior less than adults); Marty Beyer,
Immaturity, Culpability and Competence in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2000,
at 26, 27–28, available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/juvjus/cjmimmculcom.html. “Adolescents
often fail to plan or follow a plan, and get caught up in unanticipated events. They view as ‘accidental’
consequences that adults would have foreseen.” Id.
420. RETHINKING J UVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 39; Beyer, supra note 420, at 27; see
also Gerald Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on Children’s Rights, 16 NOVA L.
REV. 711, 716 (1992) (explaining the influence of time on the decision-making processes of children
and adolescents).
421. RETHINKING J UVENILE J USTICE, supra note 339, at 30; Laurence Steinberg, Is DecisionMaking the Right Framework for the Study of Adolescent Risk-Taking?, in REDUCING A DOLESCENT
RISK: TOWARD AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 18–24 (D. Romer ed., 2003).
422. Daniel Seagrave & Thomas Grisso, Adolescent Development and the Measurement of
Juvenile Psychopathy, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 229 (2002) (citing S. Small et al., Adolescents’
Perceptions of the Costs and Benefits of Engaging in Health-Compromising Behaviors, 23 J. YOUTH &
ADOLESCENCE 73-87 (1993)); see Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM . BEHAV. 249, 266
(1996) (“Between childhood and young adulthood, individuals become more future-oriented.”).
423. RETHINKING J UVENILE J USTICE, supra note 339, at 125–26; see also Beyer, supra note
419, at 27 (“Difficulty in managing impulses is normal in teenagers . . . .”).
424. David P. Farrington, Developmental and Life-Course Criminology: Key Theoretical and
Empirical Issues—The 2002 Sutherland Award Address, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 221 (2003).
425. Beyer, supra note 420, at 33 (observing that juveniles have a high moral sense and are
intolerant of “anything that seems unfair”).
426. Id. at 27.
427. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
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The second characteristic that Graham recognized is the fact that
juveniles do not have as much control over their environment as do adults
and are more susceptible to negative influences, particularly peers.428 In
fact, susceptibility to peer influence overshadows other prominent features
of adolescence.429 As important as youthful impulsivity and poor decisionmaking are on their own, when combined with the powerful peer pressure
characteristic of youth, they can turn a purely innocent event into every
parent’s nightmare.430 Adolescence, and in particular male adolescence, is
marked by the substitution of peer relationships for parents and other
familial relationships and control, as adolescents seek to establish their own
identities as separate and apart from their families.431 Peers dominate daily
social interactions among teens, and they report that they “feel most happy,
alert, and intrinsically motivated” when in the company of peers.432
The drive to gain acceptance by peers creates fertile ground for
juvenile crime. As Franklin E. Zimring has observed, “[m]ost adolescent
decisions to break the law or not take place on a social stage, where the
immediate pressure of peers is the real motive for most teenage crime.”433
Peer influence over moral judgments about whether to break the law is
particularly compelling because moral development is at its peak during
428. Id.
429. See Mary Berkheiser, Capitalizing Adolescence: Juvenile Offenders on Death Row, 59 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 135, 146 (2005). Since the early twentieth century, social scientists have studied the role
of peer influence in teenage behavior. Sutherland’s theory of differential association theorized that, like
all human behavior, criminal behavior is learned from others; see EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINOLOGY (4th ed. 1947). Burgess and Akers restated Sutherland’s theory in behavioral
psychology terminology. See Robert Burgess & Ronald Akers, A Differential Association-Reinforcement
Theory of Criminal Behavior, 14 SOC. PROBS. 128 (1966); see also Albert J. Reiss & David P.
Farrington, Advancing Knowledge About Co-Offending: Results from a Prospective Longitudinal Survey
of London Males, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 360, 360 (1991) (describing juveniles’ “universal
pattern” of committing crimes together).
430. These observations are not the province of social scientists alone. Justice Stevens, writing
for the Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma, commented on the power of peer influence: “Inexperience, less
education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her
conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer
pressure than is an adult.” 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988) (ruling that the execution of anyone under the age
of sixteen violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment).
431. Albert J. Reiss, Co-Offender Influences on Criminal Careers, in 2 CRIMINAL CAREERS AND
“CAREER CRIMINALS” 121 (Alfred Blumenstein et al. eds., 1986); see also Edward Pabon et al.,
Clarifying Peer Relations and Delinquency, 24 YOUTH & SOC’ Y 149, 160 (1992) (observing that threats
of violence and criminal victimization drive Latino youth into groups for protection even more than for
purely social reasons).
432. MARK WARR, COMPANIONS IN CRIME: THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT 13
(2002) (quoting MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & REED LARSON, BEING A DOLESCENT: CONFLICT AND
GROWTH IN THE TEENAGE YEARS 71 (1985) (reporting that teens in a community outside Chicago spent
a full one-half of the hours in a week with peers)).
433. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 78 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris
eds., 1998).
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adolescence.434 A teenager may know the difference between right and
wrong, “but resisting temptation while alone is a different task from
resisting the pressure to commit an offense when among adolescent peers
who wish to misbehave.”435 Thus, a necessary condition for a teenager to
remain law-abiding is the ability to resist peer pressure, and many lack that
skill for a long time.436 Peer conformity plays such a powerful role in
adolescent decision-making that it renders teens much less capable than
adults of making decisions based on their own independent judgment.437
And the desire for peer approval, coupled with the short-term orientation
characteristic of youth, causes teens to take risks that adults would
anticipate and avoid.438 It is therefore no accident that the most consistently
reported feature of teenage criminality is its group nature.439
The third distinguishing feature that influenced the Graham Court is
the undeveloped nature of adolescents’ character as compared to adults.440
For this concept, the Roper Court cited the seminal work of psychologist
Erik Erikson, who described the psychosocial developmental stage of
adolescence as a “moratorium” during which to allow youths to identify
with new roles of competency and invention.441 Erikson said identity
formation is the primary developmental project of adolescence.442 Thus,
adolescence is a time to “try on” different personas and to learn about
oneself as reflected through one’s interactions with others.443 Adolescence
is a time for both individuation (separating from one’s parents) and identity

434. WARR, supra note 432, at 66.
435. ZIMRING, supra note 433, at 78.
436. Id.
437. Beyer, supra note 419, at 33; see also Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz,
Developmental Psychology Goes to Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A D EVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 23 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (describing adolescence as a
“period of tremendous malleability, during which experiences in the family, peer group, school, and
other settings have a great deal of influence over the course of development”).
438. Beyer, supra note 420, at 27 (reporting that the typical gun-toting sixteen-year-old has no
intention of shooting anyone but just wants to scare someone or “look bigger”).
439. ZIMRING, supra note 434 at 79; see also Reiss, supra note 432, at 121; WARR, supra note
433, at 5. Data from the National Crime Panel show a striking difference between robberies committed
by those under twenty-one and those over twenty-one: two-thirds of those under twenty-one committed
the crime with others, whereas only slightly over one-third of those over twenty-one offended with
others, choosing instead to offend alone. Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Groups and Crime: Some
Implications of a Well-Known Secret, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 870 (1981) (citing National
Crime Panel data, provided by Wesley Skogan, Northwestern University).
440. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
441. ERIK H. ERIKSON, I DENTITY: Y OUTH AND CRISIS 128 (1968).
442. ERIK H. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 227–29 (1950).
443. See Seagrave & Grisso, supra note 422, at 226 (cautioning against misidentifying
adolescents as “psychopaths in the making” because behaviors common to adolescence also describe
adult psychopathy).
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development (“creating a coherent and integrated sense of self”).444 The
intrinsic nature of this stage of life has caused it to be described as a period
of “identity crisis.”445 As youth struggle to define their own unique
identities, they experiment in ways that often involve risky, illegal, or
dangerous activities, all in the quest for immediate rewards and ever-greater
thrills.446 For most, “this period of experimentation is fleeting; it ceases with
maturity as identity becomes settled.”447 The transition to adulthood is
marked by “the attainment of a settled identity”—that is, a sense of being a
competent person with a useful role to play in society.448
Characteristics of adolescence are relevant to adolescent criminal
behavior because “a large portion of youthful criminal activity represents
the experimentation in risky behavior that is a part of the developmental
process of individuation and identity formation—combined with the
psychosocial immaturity that contributes to poor judgment and deficient
decision-making generally.”449 Because an adolescent’s identity is still in
the formative process, “an important component of culpability in the typical
criminal act—the connection between the bad act and morally deficient
character—is missing in [the adolescent’s] conduct.”450 Scott and Steinberg
further observe that “[m]ost teenagers desist from criminal behavior . . . [as
they] develop a stable sense of identity, a stake in their future, and mature
judgment.”451 Thus, because most adolescents who commit crimes are “not
on a trajectory to pursue a life of crime, a key consideration in responding
to their criminal conduct is the impact of dispositions on their prospects for
productive adulthood.”452 This concern is particularly poignant when one
considers that once in adult court, even a five-year-old is subject to the
same mandatory minimum and maximum sentences in adult prison as his
adult counterparts.453
444. RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 50.
445. Id. at 51; ERIKSON, supra note 441, at 91 (“We may, in fact, speak of the identity crisis as
the psychosocial aspect of adolescing.”).
446. RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 51.
447. Id. at 51.
448. Id. at 34–35; James E. Marcia, Development and Validation of Ego Identity Status, 3 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 551 (1966) (reporting on empirical research into Erikson’s theory
regarding the attempt to establish identity during adolescence and finding that those best equipped to
resolve the crisis of early adulthood are those who have most successfully resolved the crisis of
adolescence).
449. RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 53.
450. Id. at 137.
451. Id. at 53; see also Terrie Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course Persistent Antisocial
Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674 (1993) (explaining that adolescent
offenders fall into one of two groups: a large group whose antisocial behavior begins and ends in
adolescence and a much smaller group whose behavior continues into adulthood).
452. RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 55.
453. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2025–26 (2010) (recounting the State of Florida’s
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To be afforded “some realistic opportunity to obtain release” as
mandated by Graham,454 every juvenile offender serving an adult sentence
must have his or her sentence reviewed for disproportionality under a
categorical analysis that takes full account of his or her youth at the time of
the offense and of all of the implications of that youth.455 If, as the Supreme
Court has told us, juveniles have less culpability in death penalty and life
without parole cases because of their youth, then that same lessened
culpability must diminish their responsibility when they have suffered less
severe adult penalties. It is true, as Zimring has observed, that
“[d]iminished responsibility is either generally applicable or generally
unpersuasive as a mitigating principle.”456
In addition, reform at the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings
involving juveniles is essential to a just and proportionate juvenile
sentencing regime. Only such front-end reform will begin to address what
Justice Kennedy said the “dilemma of juvenile sentencing demonstrates.”457
That dilemma is a creature of the transformation that occurs with trial in
adult court because, once there, no constraints on punishment exist. In adult
criminal court, a juvenile may receive any sentence an adult can receive, a
consequence to which Graham appeared to invite an end.
Whether at the time of sentencing or in a challenge to a sentence
already imposed, penal proportionality must be the overriding governing
principle. This is not a radical assertion because penal proportionality has
acknowledgement at oral argument that under Florida law even a five-year-old could be prosecuted as
an adult and receive a life without parole sentence); see also SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 328, at
105–06, 108 (noting that legislative enactments may authorize prosecutors to transfer juvenile cases to
criminal court—and in some states, bring the original charge in criminal court—and try the juvenile as
an adult; likewise, many states have reduced the confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings and have
made them more open).
454. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
455. One effect of incarceration in an adult prison on an adolescent’s youth is the pain of that
incarceration. Even one day in an adult prison is harsh for a juvenile offender. Given reports of rampant
sexual assault in prison, it seems likely that younger, smaller inmates are more susceptible to assault by
their older, more powerful counterparts. See Barkow, supra note 125, at 1167–68. Yet the pain of
incarceration has not received the Court’s attention. Every day in our country’s prisons, inmates suffer
abuse and physical injury at the hands of fellow inmates and rogue guards. Id. When Congress was
considering the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, it received evidence that over 1,000,000 prisoners
had been sexually assaulted in prison over the previous 20 years. See Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity,
and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 111, 125–26 (2007); see also Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More Than It Hurts You: Social
and Legal Consequences of Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 NOTRE D AME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’ Y 1,
21–22 (2002) (describing the substantive quality of punishment adolescents experience in adult
incarceration as far harsher than the sanctions they experience as delinquents); Tigar, supra note 391, at
852–53 (telling the story of the sexual abuse by prison guards suffered by fifteen-year-old Joseph
Galloway in a Texas detention facility).
456. ZIMRING, supra note 433, at 84.
457. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
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always been at the heart of our criminal justice system.458 However, the
Court’s non-capital proportionality decisions suggest that we have lost our
concern for penal proportionality.459 To regain the high ground, we must
train our sights on restoring the principle that punishment must be
proportionate to the culpability of the criminal actor to its central place in
our criminal justice policy.460 Only such a system will have the moral
credibility to command the respect of all who operate within it.461 For our
youth, that means recognizing that the normative developmental
deficiencies of adolescence mitigate their culpability.462 Criminal law
generally recognizes the following mitigating conditions: diminished
capacity, coercive circumstances, and lack of bad character.463 These
conditions are present in adolescent criminal behavior and collectively
signify the special nature of adolescence as mitigating.464
As discussed above, juveniles lack the fully developed decisionmaking capacity of adults because their psychosocial development is
458. See FRANCIS A LLEN, H ABITS 42–43 (1996) (commenting that for more than two centuries
“a persistent strand in liberal thought relating to penal justice has been the notion that the severity of
criminal penalties should be limited by and proportioned to the culpability of the offender and his
offense”). Even though, or perhaps because, he is a Briton, Allen for decades has written with great
insightfulness about the American legal system. See, e.g., Francis Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the
American Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 246 (1961) (discussing the
balance between constitutional rights of privacy and the law of search and seizure); Francis Allen, The
Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1950)
(describing the Supreme Court’s treatment of civil liberties cases in then-recent years).
459. See supra notes 236–327 and accompanying text.
460. See Barry C. Feld, A Slower Form of Death: Implications of Roper v. Simmons for
Juveniles Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB . POL’Y 9, 10 (2008)
(criticizing courts for ignoring the principle of penal proportionality by focusing solely on the gravity of
the offense and not on the culpability of the offender); see also AMNESTY INT’L & H UMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 372, at 113 (arguing that penal proportionality requires consideration of both the
nature of the offense and the culpability of the offender and that juveniles are categorically less culpable
than adults); Scott & Steinberg, supra note 346, at 822 (“Only a blameworthy moral agent deserves
punishment at all, and blameworthiness (and the amount of punishment deserved) can vary depending
on the attributes of the actor or the circumstances of the offense.”); Franklin E. Zimring, Penal
Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility,
in YOUTH ON TRIAL 271, 271 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (“But desert is a
measure of fault that will attach very different punishment to criminal acts that cause similar amounts of
harm.”).
461. See Paul Robinson & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 457
(1997) (explaining the importance of criminal law reflecting social consensus on what actions are
worthy of punishment).
462. RETHINKING J UVENILE J USTICE, supra note 339, at 118–48 (describing the role of
mitigation in trial of adolescents and explaining the need for a categorical approach that recognizes the
mitigating character of youth in assigning blame); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg,
(Im)Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 742 (2000); Steinberg & Scott, supra note 77, at 1012.
463. RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 130.
464. Id.
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incomplete. They focus on short-term consequences, are more impulsive
and volatile, and are “inclined to engage in risky behaviors that reflect their
immaturity of judgment.”465 These normative features of adolescence
establish the diminished capacity of adolescents in the eyes of the law.466
Similarly, the defense of duress based on extreme external circumstances is
a natural byproduct of adolescents’ lack of control over their environment,
coupled with their peer orientation and the extremes to which they feel
compelled to go to avoid the ridicule of peers.467 The environment in which
an adolescent lives exacerbates adolescent crime.468 Because teenagers are
generally financially dependent on their parents and legally subject to their
authority, they are not in a position to cut themselves loose from their
neighborhoods.469 The law recognizes in these circumstances manifestations
of duress or coercion sufficient to mitigate criminal acts.470 Adolescence is
also defined by the third mitigating condition—lack of bad character—
because the characters of adolescents are unformed.471 Most juvenile
criminal conduct is the product of transitory developmental processes, and
the vast majority of youth will outgrow their criminal inclinations as they
mature into adults.472 Thus, the absence of character development is
normative.
Because youth is a mitigating condition, the categorical rule that
Graham adopted for sentences of life without parole should translate to all
crimes committed during adolescence. While “[m]itigating conditions and
circumstances affect adult criminal choices in varying and idiosyncratic
ways” and thus call for individualized treatment of mitigation defenses, a
465. Id. at 131–33.
466. Id. at 133; ZIMRING, supra note 433, at 140–41; see Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile
Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
68, 70 (1997).
467. See WARR, supra note 432, at 46, 49; see also Jeffrey Fagan, Context and Culpability in
Youth Crime, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL’ Y & L. 507, 507–08 (1999) (discussing the effect of a person’s social
setting on adolescent crime); Ruth Beyth-Marom et al., Perceived Consequences of Risky Behaviors:
Adults and Adolescents, 29 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 549, 559–61 (1993).
468. RETHINKING JUVENILE J USTICE, supra note 339, at 135 (discussing research that shows that
when families move out of high-crime neighborhoods, the adolescents in those families are involved in
less violent crime and less crime overall) (citing Jens Ludwig et al., Urban Poverty and Juvenile Crime:
Evidence from a Randomized Housing-Mobility Experiment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 655, 676 (2001)).
469. RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 135.
470. Id.; see Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM . L.
REV. 199, 203 (1982).
471. RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 136.
472. RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 136–37 (citing Moffitt, supra note 451,
at 675). See generally Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Characterizing Criminal Careers, 237
SCI. 985, 991 (1987) (charting the correlations between age and rate of crime); Travis Hirschi &
Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AMER. J. SOC . 552, 555 (1983) (noting that
the age of distribution of crime is temporally and geographically consistent and fifteen- to seventeenyear-olds have the highest rate of crime).
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categorical approach is appropriate for adolescents because their
“development follows a roughly predictable course to maturity and [their]
criminal choices are affected predictably in ways that are mitigating of
culpability.”473 As the Graham Court recognized, even expert psychologists
cannot “differentiate between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects
unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile whose crime
reflects irreparable corruption.”474 Scott and Steinberg echo Graham’s
caution, pointing out that current diagnostic tools permit neither evaluation
of psychosocial maturity on an individualized basis nor the identification of
young “career criminals” as distinct from ordinary adolescents who will
repudiate their youthful recklessness as adults.475 Moreover, “litigating
maturity on a case-by-case basis is likely to be an error-prone undertaking,
with the outcomes determined by factors other than psychological
immaturity—such as physical appearance or demeanor.”476 Thus,
sentencing reform must be systemic and categorical if it is to give proper
weight to the mitigating effect of youth.
Barry Feld advocates one possible approach to sentencing reform: a
“youth discount” that provides “fractional reductions in sentence-lengths
based on age as a proxy for culpability.”477 Feld’s system recognizes both
the diminished responsibility of youth and the fact that adult sentences
“exact a greater ‘penal bite’ from younger offenders than older ones.”478
Feld proposes a “sliding scale of diminished responsibility that corresponds
with developmental differences . . . in maturity of judgment and self473. RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 139.
474. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 573 (2005)).
475. RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 339, at 140.
476. Id.; see also id. at 141 (raising concern about racial and ethnic bias and its effect on
punishment of youthful offenders).
477. Feld, supra note 460, at 61; see also Feld, supra note 466, at 121–33 (providing rationale
for categorical “youth discount”). But see Joseph L. Hoffman, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles
and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 233 (1989) (describing age as an imperfect proxy for a
complex of factors that constitute culpability, “includ[ing] maturity, judgment, responsibility, and the
capability to assess the possible consequences of one's conduct”); ZIMRING, supra note 433, at 150
(objecting to categorical youth discount because “age is an incomplete proxy for levels of maturity
during the years from age twelve to eighteen”);.
478. Feld, supra note 461, at 61 (citing Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionate Sentences for
Juveniles: How Different than for Adults?, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’ Y 221, 227 (2001)); see also David S.
Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, “Owing to the Extreme Nature of the Accused”: The Changing Legal
Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 641, 697–98 (2002).
We endorse Feld's proposals [for a youth discount] because they respect the
notion that juveniles are developmentally different than adults and that these
differences make juveniles both less culpable for their crimes and less deserving
of the harsh sanctions, which now must be imposed on serious and violent adult
offenders.
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control.”479 Feld acknowledges that quantification of the youth discounts is
a matter for political and legislative debate480 but posits that a twenty- or
thirty-year sentence is the most a state would ever need to satisfy its
legitimate penal goals.481 With the youth discount, Feld maintains, “[w]e
can hold juveniles accountable, manage the risks they pose to others, and
provide them with ‘room to reform’ without extinguishing their lives.”482
Moreover, recognizing the value of mitigation for youthful offenders
“provides a buffer against political pressure” to stiffen penalties every time
a juvenile commits a serious offense.483
Feld’s “youth discount” is consonant with Scott and Steinberg’s call
for a categorical mitigating principle for adolescents who commit crimes,
but it is not the only possible approach to proportionality in adolescent
sentencing. Given society’s special responsibility for the welfare of its
young, policy-makers and juvenile-justice experts must seize the
opportunity to fashion a system that does justice to both our young people
and the society in which they will mature into adulthood. Employing
mitigation principles at the sentencing stage will prevent the kinds of
sentences that have punished without consideration of proportionality or
mercy, which now must be undone through categorical rulings in the state
and federal courts. The wave of punitive laws that swept through the
country in the late 1980s and early 1990s can no longer be allowed to
define criminal justice policy for our youth, especially knowing what we
now know of the profound effects that adolescent immaturity has on
blameworthiness. Juveniles are not adults, and our sentencing laws need to
stop pretending otherwise.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Graham v. Florida mandates review
of the sentences of all juvenile offenders serving life without parole for
non-homicides. The Graham decision also opened the door to sentencing
review for those convicted as juveniles and serving time in adult prisons,
including those serving life without parole for homicide. Because
sentencing youth in the adult criminal justice system was never
contemplated by the measures that caused their trial as adults, the sentences
juveniles have received do not reflect the lessened culpability that is a
479. Feld, supra note 460, at 62.
480. Id. at 63.
481. Id.
482. Id. at 64 (citing ZIMRING, supra note 433, at 152).
483. Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth Violence, 24
CRIME & JUST. 189, 248 (1998).
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necessary attribute of youth. The well-known and well-established
differences between adolescents and adults must take center stage in the
review of current sentences and the imposition of future ones. The
characteristics of youth are and must be seen as mitigating of any
punishment that an adult would receive for the same crime. And if the
lower courts are not up to the task, youthful offenders will follow in the
steps of Terrance Graham and Christopher Simmons by looking to the
Supreme Court to protect them when the vicissitudes of majoritarian
politics cause those who should know better to lose sight of the fact that
they are still kids.

